The United States in Change: Migration and Other Global Connections

Abstract

Patrick Manning

This essay explores change in the United States through the optic of migration. Migration has been a prominent factor in the history of the United States since the beginning, especially because of its empire of trade, as described by historian Donna Gabaccia. In addition, migrations are among the great topics of conflict and debate in the United States today. The essay gives an overview of migration and "immigrant foreign relations" from 1800 to the present, showing how migrants came gradually to be seen as a threat. As a comparison, migration since 1800 for the world as a whole is shown to be both similar to and different from migration to the United States. To explain the politics of migration, the essay describes popular culture as a global and national force, showing how it has gradually tended to give support to migrants yet also leads to anti-migrant movements. The conclusion considers the United States and the incoming Trump administration in the wake of the 2016 election. Migrant populations are under increased threat but, most likely, have the strength and alliances to retain their current position of importance within the United States.

Key Words: Empire, Immigrant Foreign Relations, Migration, Popular Culture, Refugees, Xenophobia

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〈Special Contribution: Keynote Speaker's Address〉

The United States in Change: Migration and Other Global Connections*

Patrick Manning
(University of Pittsburgh, US)

The United States is undergoing important changes today, both in its domestic affairs and in its international relations. In this address to Korean scholars in American Studies, I propose to explore change in the United States through a particular optic—that of migration. It is certainly not the case that migration can explain everything about the United States and its transformations. Yet migration has been a prominent factor in history of the United States since the beginning, and the study of migration has the benefit of connecting points of origin and destination

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for individuals and for the ideas and the material goods they bring with them. In addition, migrations of various types are among the great topics of conflict and debate in the United States today.

Migration historian Donna Gabaccia has written a very insightful little book, *Foreign Relations*, on which I will rely in introducing the past changes and current problems in migration.[1] Her story shows a remarkable change in American visions of migration and migrants, from an early emphasis on the freedom of migrants to go where they wish to a growing fear of migrants as dangerous influences, which need to be restricted and perhaps expelled.

I begin by retelling Gabaccia's story about the complexities and changes in U.S. migration. Then I compare U.S. migration with migration throughout the world during the past two centuries—has American migration been typical or unique in comparison with migration patterns worldwide? For another thing, I will show the relationship of migration to popular culture in the United States, and how the two have changed together. Then I conclude by linking the two issues of migration and popular culture to the problem of inequality: a dilemma now being fought out in the American presidential election.

Before entering the tale of migration in United States history, I want to emphasize the major categories of migration. Migration in the modern world is usually divided into *international migration* (across national boundaries) and *domestic migration* (within national boundaries). For a given nation, there is the difference between *immigration* (into the nation) and *emigration* (out of the nation). Further, each nation experiences *domestic* or regional migration, as people (either native-born or foreign-born) move from one part of the nation to another. *Urbanization* is an important example of domestic migration, though it may also include international migrants. Finally, *intercontinental migration* is migration from Europe to the Americas or from Africa to Europe, neglecting the migration of people across national boundaries within continents. We will need to keep clear on the differences among these kinds of migration.

Donna Gabaccia's book relies on a helpful play on words—she takes "immigrant foreign relations" to mean the continuing ties of migrants to their families at a distance. The book provides two overlapping narratives. One traces immigration to (and emigration from) the U.S.; the other narrates the changing position of the U.S. in the world, through trade, diplomacy, and war. The combination reveals significant but often-neglected patterns in both domestic and foreign affairs. As Gabaccia argues, "To understand how globalization enabled Americans to discover and learn to fear immigrant foreign relations, one must attend both to a well-studied theme—the country's abandonment of isolation as it built an empire of trade and acquired foreign territories—and to the less-well-understood lives of the mobile Americans who built the American empire of trade."[2]

United States migration and international relations, 1800 to present.

Figure 1 shows a standard summary of immigration to the United States from 1820 to 2000. It displays total annual numbers of *immigrants* each year on the bottom curve and annual immigrants as a proportion of the United States population on the top curve. If we looked at a graph of all foreign-born residents of the United States as a proportion of total population, we would see that the foreign-born were 10% to 15% of the nation's population from 1850 to 1950 and again after 1980. If we also add their American-born children, a number equal to or greater number

1) Donna Gabaccia, *Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

2) Ibid., 77.

than their parents, we would see that first- and second-generation immigrants in the United States have remained at 20% to 30% of the total population since 1850, except for the period from 1950 to 1980. This large proportion of foreign-origin people in the United States—nearly one third of the population—has been involved in "immigrant foreign relations," links to their foreign relatives.



Figure 1. Immigrants to the United States, Total and Number per 1,000 in Resident Population: 1820–1998. Adapted from *Historical Statistics of the United States. Millennial Edition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Figure 1. Source: Gabaccia, *Foreign Relations*, p. 5.

On the other hand, American ideas about the nation, the world, and migration have differed from what one might expect from Figure 1. Gabaccia explains early American ideas about migration with three points. First, the American nation, as it was founded, took on a simplified view of itself as isolated from the world. By extension, any migrants who came to America were absorbed completely into America, sustaining no ongoing ties to their homelands. This outlook allowed for admission (if not welcoming) of great numbers of immigrants.

Second, the United States Constitution of 1787 gave the federal government full control of regulating commerce, allowing no such powers to states or localities. In those days, the movement of people was treated as part of commerce. As a result, state legislators could do nothing to restrict the flow of migrants. The great national dispute in American commercial policy centered on tariffs—on commercial taxation of goods, especially manufactured goods, imported into the United States. High tariffs were commonly favored by industrial producers, centered in the northeast of the United States, since higher prices on imported manufactures enabled them to sell domestically produced manufactures at a higher profit. In addition, tariffs were the principal source of revenue for the federal government. In contrast, agricultural interests, centered in the western and southern states, favored low tariffs, which would make their agricultural output more attractive on the world market in exchange for imported goods. This dispute continued for a century, but without limiting migration by much.

Third, America was not in fact isolated. The new nation was deeply involved in global commerce from the beginning: the Napoleonic wars, from 1795 to 1815, provided American merchants with great opportunities to carry trade as a neutral nation. Further, immigrants to the United States maintained ties to their country of birth and to other countries. They sent funds to their families, sent family members back

and forth, invested in their home villages, and acted on their concerns about politics in their home region. At times these immigrants called on the governments of their home countries to give them support in disputes within the United States.

From the 1840s, Gabaccia traces the growing emigration of American individuals and groups, as they built an empire by reaching out in two directions—across the lands of the North American continent (what became the American West) and across the oceans of the Atlantic and the Pacific. In each direction, the ventures of these migrants included agricultural settlement, commerce, missionary involvement, and military ventures. While the number of American out-migrants was much smaller than the number of in-migrants, the out-migrants were of great significance. Once settled in Hawaii, China, Korea, or Dominican Republic, they too had their own "immigrant foreign relations." That is, they traveled back and forth, sent remittances, and involved themselves in politics both in their land of settlement and in the United States. When they ran into difficulties, they called on the American government for assistance. In turn, the American government turned to building a navy and an army and to acquiring foreign territories.

American rise to global leadership rested on expanding industries relying on immigrant workers in an era of shifting global economic relations. Rural Europeans were pushed off the land and into factories; those who migrated to America began to go more to cities than farms. Settlers coming to the United States encountered mixed responses. On one hand they gained a feeling of liberty, finding a society in which one could avoid small slights of hierarchy. But when immigrants took up political activity, they encountered negative responses. Russian-born anarchist Alexander Berkman shot industrialist Henry Clay Frick in retaliation for the death of striking workers in the 1892 Homestead steel strike in Pittsburgh. Frick survived, but immigrants could be portrayed as

disrespectful of laws and customs; their presence brought worries about the foreign colonies that immigrants were founding in American cities and countryside. Theories of scientific racism that encouraged empire-building also fostered hostility toward immigrant foreigners. Nativist Americans spoke increasingly of immigrants' lack of capacity for independence, individual achievement, or language learning. In one result, English language requirements were imposed for citizenship beginning 1906.

By 1913 almost half of imports to the United States came from the Americas and Asia, regions of American imperial outreach. The demand for protection for Americans abroad grew, resulting in claims for extraterritoriality, in which Americans abroad would live under American law rather than under local law. Episodes of legal disputes and military risings took place in Hawaii, in the Spanish-American war of 1898, the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 in China, and numerous United States interventions in Central America and the Caribbean.

As a result, xenophobia at home became a concomitant of American geopolitics. The killing of President McKinley by an anarchist led to a ban on anarchist immigrants. From 1880, Congress responded to claims in California against Chinese immigration, by banning laborers from China (though Chinese merchants could still enter). In response, in 1905 Chinese merchants around the Pacific organized a boycott of American goods—trade fell by up to 50%, and President Theodore Roosevelt responded with attempts to reassure Chinese merchants—but not ordinary workers. In this way, the American executive branch gave growing attention to multilateral geopolitical strategies, while immigration policy fell under domestic, legislative influence.

Tensions grew in the early twentieth century. The industrial argument had been that high tariffs reduced imports, brought high wages and also brought immigration, but it lost out to the argument that the threat to jobs came from immigrant workers, not from imported

goods. The Immigration Restriction League, formed at Harvard University in 1894, called for literacy tests. The United States avoided entering World War I for over two years, but in 1917 President Woodrow Wilson led the country into war on the side of the Allies with an internationalist program: to lower tariffs, to "make the world safe for democracy," and to create a League of Nations. In response, isolationist opponents, led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, called for a return to isolationism, calling immigrant "mongrels" a threat to democracy, and praising a pure, homogeneous American people.

In this atmosphere of isolationism, the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act limited American immigration to some 165,000 persons per year, with specific limits on migration from almost every Eurasian region (but with no national restrictions on immigration from the Americas). Immigration dropped sharply, and the available visas were granted abroad rather than at the United States border. It was consistent with this shift that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt moved the Immigration and Naturalization Service from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice and that, once the U.S. and Japan were at war in late 1941, over 100,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were interned in isolated camps for over two years. On the other hand, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower supported the immigration of war brides to American servicemen, and an arrangement was made for the admission of 30,000 Hungarians after the 1956 revolt in Hungary.

Twenty years after the World War II ended, Congress adjusted its course in 1965, with the Hart-Celler Immigration Reform Act easing migration. This legislation made tiny changes to quotas for Eurasian migrants, added quotas for American countries, but created exemptions from these limits for spouses, parents, and minor children of migrants.

While various popular campaigns and legislative acts alternated between easing and restricting immigration, migration after 1965 principally reflected further extension of American economic empire in Latin America, Caribbean, and Asia. The Refugee Act of 1980 broadened the U.S. definition of refugees to meet that of the United Nations, but required negotiation with Congress to admit over 50,000 refugees in any year. The North American Free Trade Agreement, implemented in 1994, allowed for free movement of commodities but not of people. In 1998, the Reagan administration supported an expanded quota for Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union. Construction of fences along the U.S.-Mexico border began in California in 1990, and expanded steadily thereafter. For instance, by the early 21st century there were a million persons in the United States who had been born in the Mexican state of Puebla, some 25% of the home population. Remittances of these migrants to their home exceeded direct foreign investment and encouraged growth of Puebla; meanwhile deportation rates from the United States soared. The total number of migrants without visas in the United States reached 10 or 11 million.

By 2000, the term "globalization" gained wide influence, suggesting that there were new and frightening sorts of international connections. Fears that had previously been projected on the Soviet Union and Communism were now projected on the religion of Islam, in political and cultural terms, and in economic terms on the Asian Tigers and China. Interpretations of globalization focused on states, decline of states, and multinationals. Perceptions of American decline fostered revival of xenophobia. Voters could not control globalization or foreign policy, but could vote for representatives to protect them from immigration.

World migration, 1800 to present

Worldwide patterns of migration have been at once similar to and different from the patterns of American immigration. In the peak of

human migration, from 1840 to 1940, roughly 160 million migrants crossed the oceans, while a roughly equal number of migrants moved within the continents. In this same period the United States received some 32 million new immigrants, or 20% of the world total.

Early in the nineteenth century, the great majority of intercontinental migrants were enslaved Africans sent from Western Africa up to 1850, especially to Brazil and Cuba; other enslaved migrants from Eastern Africa went to Indian Ocean destinations even up to the 1890s. Western European migration across the Atlantic grew rapidly from the 1840s to the 1880s; indentured migrants from India moved from the 1840s to Indian Ocean territories, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Migrants from South China moved across the Pacific from the 1850s, but discrimination in the Americas redirected most South Chinese migrants to Southeast Asia up to the 1930s; migrants from North China moved to northeast Asia, overlapping with Russian, Japanese, and Korean migrants.

From the 1870s, Atlantic migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe —of Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish and Muslim faiths—expanded in numbers. Migrants from Russia moved beyond the state (especially Jews heading west) and within the state, eastward as far as the Pacific. Japanese migrants moved to the Pacific, to Brazil, and to Japanese colonies. Migrants moved to Africa from India, Italy, France, and Britain; African migrants, enslaved, moved to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Overall, the world experienced an unprecedented wave of migration from 1840 to 1940.

World War II brought sharply different migrations, most of them short-term, but still of great significance. Japanese wartime migration, during the 1930s and 1940s, displaced millions within the military but also brought migration of many civilians throughout the empire. Similarly, the United States dispatched millions of troops throughout the world during the war, and brought them home only slowly at the end of the war.

Postwar migration was small by comparison to earlier times, but it gradually expanded. Decolonization, from 1945 to the 1970s, brought migration between the newly independent territories and the former imperial centers: growing streams of migrants moved from the Caribbean, India, and Indonesia to Europe. With time, Caribbean, Mexican, and Asian migrants moved to North America, and migrants from Southeast Asia moved to many parts of Asia and other continents. African migrants grew in numbers from the 1960s.

Refugee migration grew during and after World War II. Postwar European refugees became the basis for creating the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. But the number of refugees grew worldwide, especially as wars of decolonization and civil wars in newly independent states drove many from their homes—in South America but especially in Asia and Africa. Overall, the timing of migration to the United States was somewhat different from that of other regions, but the overall pattern was similar: rapid growth in migration from 1850 that ended in the 1930s, a peak in military migration during World War II, and a somewhat slower acceleration in migration from the 1950s to the early 2000s.

Popular culture as a national and global force

Migrant groups are not simply demographic clusters—they are also cultural communities. Migrant groups retain their ancestral culture and, at the same time, they develop cultural innovations as they move and share in larger cultural communities along with their voyages and settlement. If their ancestral culture was seen as the "folklore" of localized communities, in lands of settlement their folkloric traditions came to be added to and encompassed within a much broader "popular culture"—shared broadly because of the displacement, interaction, and exchange among so many migrants in the course of the nineteenth and

twentieth centuries. Further, such sharing extended to the interaction of native-born and immigrant communities. As a result, this eclectic popular culture, emerging in the United States and in other countries, reached across communities, celebrating ordinary people rather than the highbrow culture of the elite.

In America, the notion of popular culture grew early and effectively. America had no hereditary aristocracy, though it did have hierarchy in property and in slave-holding. Still, citizenship was relatively accessible for migrants, and settlers in the United States gained a feeling of liberty, of mobility, and avoidance of social slights felt in migrant homelands. Immigrant groups sometimes mobilized to influence events in their homelands: Irish republicans even made attacks on British Canada and an Italian migrant returned to assassinate the king of Italy in 1900. Actions taken by ordinary people, with their complaints against "bankers, speculators, and the idle rich," ranged across various political and social campaigns. A campaign to extend the franchise, from the 1820s to the 1860s, gained votes for all so all male citizens rather than only those with a certain amount of property—including African Americans (but not Native Americans until 1924). Other reforms, later in the nineteenth century, included the election rather than appointment of judges, the institution of the recall (in which unpopular elected officials could be removed by petition).

These reforms, intended to limit the influence of the wealthy, had modest effects. In another reform, in 1913 the United States adopted a federal income tax, intended to be progressive in that it collected larger proportions of tax from those of higher income. With this additional revenue, the debates over tariffs as a source of revenue now declined.

Meanwhile, certain landowners, merchants, manufacturers, and financiers came to have growing power. The experience of the Comstock Lode of Virginia City, the Nevada silver strike that produced great wealth

from 1859 to 1874, stands out as an example. Using Mexican mining techniques, the initial quantities of silver were carried by mule train across the Sierra Nevada to ports in Stockton and Sacramento. Financiers based in San Francisco supported the development of important technical advances that brought water from near Lake Tahoe to the mills in and near Virginia City. These same financiers funded the work of designing and building a railroad from Sacramento up the impossibly-steep Sierra Nevada to reach the silver and, incidentally, connect to the transcontinental railroad whose construction had been stalled. But in addition to the capital-intensive technical improvements of silver mining and railroad construction, these same financiers undertook manipulations that enabled them to end up as the owners of almost all of the riches that came from the mines. Thus, in addition to the productivity of American industry, the appropriation of wealth through financial manipulation led to periodic shifts in inequality in the 1860s, in 1900 with Andrew Carnegie, J.P. Morgan and the consolidation of U.S. Steel, and after 2000 with the consolidation of great banking and stock-trading firms.

In the early twentieth-century era of massive immigration to the U.S., popular culture expanded but maintained its divisions. The nativist faction of Americans, however, was as large or larger than that of the foreign-origin population. As early as the 1850s, a semi-secret, nativist political party known as the Know Nothings, encouraged ideas of fear and racism. With time there were many collisions and nasty battles within American popular culture. But one may note the ways in which cultural activists among Jews, African-Americans, and Italian-Americans developed forms that became popular within their community but also beyond their community, in that their ethnic specificity came to be presented as part of a broader American-ness. Thus, popular culture is neither inherently cosmopolitan nor inherently xenophobic. An important group within popular culture was African-Americans, who were

long-settled communities rather than recent migrants, yet still subject to discrimination. Their campaign in popular culture is especially striking in demonstrating the overall pattern. They created a common African-American identity out of diverse African ethnicities. Their achievements in education, music, visual art, drama, and literature created works of value that strengthened their own community and also gained allies, building a platform for later campaigns for political rights after World War II. More generally, the contributions of many ethnic and other social groups to a cosmopolitan popular culture (in music, dance, literature, film, dress, and cuisine) presented a substantial base for a wider unity among ordinary people that had not been conceivable a century earlier.

Perhaps similar developments were taking place in other nations and empires. Worldwide, the era from the 1930s through the 1960s was unusual in its attention to social welfare—expansion of pensions, health programs, public education in many countries and colonies, yet apparently for each nation separately. For the United States, the Social Security Act was approved in 1935, providing pensions at the time of retirement or disability to all who had worked and paid into the system. This national pension system, founded some twenty years later than those of Western European countries, fit into a vision of government support for national economic welfare that prevailed for several decades before being reversed to a large degree in the 1980s. The economic theories of John Maynard Keynes encouraged investment in social welfare, public education, and public housing to build economic demand.

Yet in the midst of this era of social welfare, World War II broke out as a struggle to the death among the great imperial powers: the US/UK and their clients; Germany and Italy and their desire to gain greater influence in Europe; the USSR as an influence in Europe and Asia; Japan and its desire to gain greater control over China and other parts of Asia. Uniquely, the homeland regime of the United States was never

threatened. All the other imperial groupings were either destroyed or very seriously threatened with destruction. Three empires survived: the United states, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.

Following World War II and imperial collapse, decolonization arose as a major force for developing global popular culture. The idea of decolonization had gained strength during the war because of the wartime campaign against racial discrimination. Newly independent countries achieved dramatic advances in health and education as well as some advance in economic levels. The American Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s-60s interacted with the worldwide advance of decolonization, the political scales shifted away from racism and xenophobia. The 1965 Hart-Celler Act, which opened conditions for immigration to the United States for the first time since 1924, was not only about immigration but was also consistent with the prevailing call for reducing racial and ethnic restrictions.

Decolonization, civil rights movements, and the U.S. opening to increased migration unfolded at exactly the same time as the Cold War confrontation between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the allies of each appeared to dominate world affairs. One example of overlap between these two great processes was the Korean War. At the end of the war, many Koreans migrated to the U.S., for instance as spouses, many American soldiers remained stationed in Korea, and the popular culture movements of America and Korea began their long and productive interactions.

This overview of the place of migration in popular culture—nationwide and worldwide—is a greatly oversimplified picture in that neither the wealthy nor the ordinary citizens were coherent and unified groups. The ordinary people included those of many ethnic, religious, and regional communities, including immigrants and those recognized as minorities, the poor (either urban or rural), wage workers, owners of

small businesses, the "middle class," consisting of well-paid wage earners and professionals, and some members of the rising elite. Similarly, the wealthy were divided by their various industries or sources of wealth, with interests that were sometimes directly conflicting.

Global popular culture expanded along many paths during the remainder of the twentieth century. But a new initiative that came from the powerful, the wealthy, and the centers of economic empire served to limit and divert the expansion of popular culture. The term "neoliberalism" has now become widely adopted to describe an ideology and a set of corporate and governmental policies that give top priority to the maximization of corporate profit, privatization of government enterprises, minimization of government regulation of private firms, and weakening of any social or political forces opposing these policies. Neoliberal concern with profit maximization and free trade led to no particular concern with migration and no concern with the emerging environmental crisis of global warming and destruction of species. The national administrations of Ronald Reagan in the U.S. and Margaret Thatcher in the UK, during the 1980s, supported neoliberal policies actively, as did the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in financial relations with ex-colonial nations.

The prestige of neoliberal philosophy and policy became extraordinary. From 1989 to 1992, when popular movements around the world arose to challenge dictatorial governments, the results of these uprisings were implementation of neoliberal cutbacks rather than the implementation of Keynesian-style programs of social welfare. Later, after average incomes had declined for decades in numerous countries and when the continuing consolidation of financial institutions set off a great financial crash in 2008-2009, the result in all major countries was to draw tax funds—from ordinary people—to bail out the banks. While these issues were not directly linked to migration, the frustrations of the general population led to expression of nativist feelings, blaming immigrants for the difficulties. The problems were increasingly global, but the debates remained constrained at the national level.

Historical Patterns and Current Changes in the United States

Several of Donna Gabaccia's points on migration history and U.S. history overall stand out significantly. These points emphasize long-term continuity rather than short-term shifts.

- With time, immigrants ceased to be seen as positive contributors to the U.S. and were increasingly seen as fearsome influences.
- Nevertheless, for most times since 1850, first- and second-generation immigrants in the U.S., have totaled some 30% of the population, an important portion of the total.
- The shifts in views on migrants in U.S. society have been slow and complex, with many victories for both immigrant and anti-immigrant sides, but immigrants have gradually moved toward recognition as equals.
- Interaction of the United States with its "empire" has been an important guide to U.S. policy, where "empire" is defined as the places globally where emigrants, investments, and U.S. territory or military are located.
- 1924 brought a turning point in that Congress was able to nearly halt immigration. From that time, the U.S. executive pressed for free trade more than ever.
- From 1965 immigration has grown, but at a lower rate than before 1924.
- U.S. immigration continues to be interpreted in a strictly national framework.

To the above points from Gabaccia, I add the following.

- Popular culture has grown steadily in the U.S. and worldwide, and the role of migration in popular culture has continued to grow.
- In the United States, the function of the long debate on migration has been to sustain a border-focused national framework rather than a comprehensive view of migration and immigrant foreign relations. This national discourse on migration divides ordinary people.
- American popular culture and nationalism sustain competing versions—a nativist outlook that treats immigration as a threat; and a cosmopolitan nationalism celebrating a melting pot. These contending views prevent the development of a global view of American society.
- The American empire of trade remains dominant, relying significantly on American military power deployed at strategic bases worldwide and bringing foreign conflicts into the domestic political scene. The global economic leadership is seen especially through steadily concentrating financial interests, crossing boundaries at will, with growing profits. At present, despite the furious political conflict within the U.S., the wealthy corporate elite appears to be getting what it wants on free trade and deregulation, meanwhile ignoring environmental crisis as a strategic issue. It worries little about the specifics of migration, but generally opposes any political organization among ordinary people.
- **Despite the global hegemony of the United States, there remain** contending empires: the European Union (with or without the United Kingdom), China, and Russia (not to mention Japan and India). These empires interact with each other and with adjoining regions as hot spots of conflict (southwest Asia and Africa) and as currently quiescent regions (Latin America). Both the imperial contention described here and the financial concentration described in the previous point have the effect of building tension throughout the world.

The recent United States presidential campaign was unusual in its degree of polarization. The previously dominant factors in political life—neoliberalism, inequality, ethnic hierarchy, neglect of social welfare, ecological crisis, and fear of terrorism—remained in play. What was different was that the Republican Party candidate, Donald J. Trump, brought a shift in political tactics, abandoning decorum and twisting truth to elicit and manipulate anger of voters unhappy with declining incomes. He first displaced all his Republican opponents and ultimately won a technical victory over the Democrats. The debates, unbalanced in rhetoric but highly partisan overall, did not bring any sustained analysis of the issues. In any case, almost none of the arguments took up a framework going beyond that of the nation: national politics seem not to allow for debate of global issues.

Trump emphasized extreme nativism, racism, and opposition to migration—especially of Mexicans and Muslims. In traditional conservative terms, he opposed welfare programs, health care programs, and regulation of corporate activity; he called for cuts to taxes and supported the gun lobby. Then in an outlook labeled by many as "populist," he also opposed free trade, opposed privileges for bankers, sought support from alienated workers while opposing trade unions, and rejected scientific evidence on environmental change and other topics. In the Democratic primary elections, Bernie Sanders showed that there was great support for a "political revolution," meaning especially a return to Keynesian policy for social welfare, including trade unions. Hillary

Clinton balanced between the two, won the Democratic nomination with women's support and especially with the support of established party leaders. In the general election she supported a broad coalition highlighting cosmopolitan popular culture and modest reforms for migration, health, and education, but continuing an alliance with big capital and support for the empire.

I was wrong, like many others, in predicting a victory for Clinton. The voter turnout was high on both sides. Jurisdictions, as before, were biased to make Republican votes count for more than Democratic votes. Minority communities and descendants of migrants, of all social classes and economic levels, voted heavily for Clinton, and she won the total vote. But the biggest increase in votes came from those identifying as working-class whites, who saw themselves as natives wishing to take back control of their country, and who accepted the argument that a wealthy person could speak effectively for the rest of them. (These people chose to forget that they too were descendants of immigrants, and that the ancestry of the average African-American in the U.S. goes back further in time than for the average white person.) The combination of nationalism and Gerrymandering brought Trump a victory in the Electoral College and enabled Republicans to maintain their dominance in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.[3]

While Trump, at the beginning of his presidency, is now advancing the extreme proposals for which he campaigned, it is not clear that the actual political results in the U.S. will change greatly. The overall

3) The term "Gerrymandering" refers to the drawing of electoral jurisdictions so as to bias the results by putting disproportionate numbers of one party in a few districts while the other party with majorities (but smaller majorities) in a larger number of districts. The term comes from the 1812 redistricting of Massachusetts, when the districts proposed by Governor Elbridge Gerry included a long, slim jurisdiction around Boston that was claimed to look like a salamander or a "Gerrymander."

"gridlock" of American government has been in place for some years, with partisan opposition preventing many decisions from being taken. Such gridlock may continue for some time. Republicans and Democrats each remain splintered in various ways. Democrats, especially partisans of Sanders, retain substantial representation in the House and Senate and will be significant in local politics. Republicans are sharply divided among supporters of big business, small business, and wage-earners.

Beyond the level of government officials, popular culture in the United States, while a powerful force overall, seems now to be split as many as four ways: (1) nativist nationalism in support of Trump, with vague dreams of reorganizing the nation's politics and economy; (2) traditional conservatives, supporting small-business interests; (3) supporters of a "political revolution" following Bernie Sanders, opposing big business and calling for Keynesian public welfare programs; (4) traditional liberals, hoping for an alliance of business and the general public. Meanwhile, and arguably beyond popular culture, there exists a broad coalition of big business—itself separated into the industrial sector, the information-science sector, and the financial sector. The latter group maintains its power and has so far faced no serious threats. One could imagine that Trump might attempt to weaken or even break up big banks, playing to his populist supporters and seeking to ally with supporters of a "political revolution." I'm relatively sure that Trump will lose interest in this project rapidly.

One outstanding point was that the pro-Trump voters supported him despite his numerous lies, insults, and disrespectful behavior toward women. In the short term, it raises the question of whether the political culture in the United States will shift to one in which there is no basis for mutual understanding and compromise—thus, the institutionalization of gridlock and the end of agreement on basic facts. This is a question in national political tradition. Turning to consideration of the long term,

such a shift in political leadership calls up memories of Hitler's rise to electoral power in 1933, after the great crash of 1929, and of the expanding confrontations that led to global war. Here we have to look beyond the national landscape and ask about global patterns of change. In parallel with the 1930s, it is chilling to see the present-day expansion of nationalistic and increasingly autocratic regimes in countries on every continent.

To conclude this survey, let us return to our central concern: the role of migration and the foreign relations of migrants in United States history. For the immediate future of migration policy and practice, I am not sure that there will be immediate changes. Trump continued to the end of his campaign in saying he would build a wall at the Mexican border, but I am dubious that any more than a small additional section of wall will be built. The deportation of undocumented immigrants, which has continued during the Obama administration, will surely continue. Assuming that Trump sustains his call for expulsion of large numbers of undocumented immigrants, there will surely be confrontations on this issue. Nevertheless, vigorous opposition to such expulsions will also arise, especially from Hispanic citizens whose numbers of voters rose so sharply in the recent election. The United States will likely speak vaguely about global refugee policies, but continue to maintain a very slow stream of refugees entering the U.S. Further, the level of bureaucracy in migration and other sorts of travel will remain at a high level. In sum, despite the fluctuations, I believe that the long-term pattern of incremental change in migration will continue, and that migrants and their foreign relations will continue to gain in socio-political acceptance.

What is the relationship between global popular culture and U.S. popular culture? U.S. popular culture has shown itself to be far more deeply split than was thought, with a big expansion in nationalism and white supremacism. Yet cosmopolitan popular culture also maintains great strength in the U.S. and remains intimately tied to popular culture around the world. If there should happen to be an alignment between the migration-focused outlooks within the U.S. and visions of popular culture that are most prominent worldwide, there is a chance for a major opening in freedom of migration. Such an opening to migration might also bring a challenge to neoliberal policies and a move back toward Keynesian support for social welfare. In my opinion, such a change is conceivable over the course of a generation or so, but not within the next decade.

Works Cited

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