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CHAPTER 9

DIASPORIC STREAMS IN PAN-AFRICANISM, CAPITALISM, AND MARXISM: THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF BLACK IDEOLOGY

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"Pan-Aricanism or Communism?" asked George Padmore in the title of his 1956 book, and the question provided its own answer.[1] Padmore, the Trinidadian political activist, rose to the highest levels of the Comintern in 1930, then developed a virulent opposition to Marxism and to Soviet policies, which he maintained while providing political counsel to Kwame Nkrumah in the glorious days of postwar struggle for African independence. Leaders of the postwar nationalist movements all over Africa and the African diaspora made the same anti-communist choice: they sought to discern a third choice in the Cold War confrontation, one of neutralism, non-alignment, and African socialism.

In the 1980s, by contrast, Marxist governments held power in several African countries, Marxist political parties thrived in African and Caribbean countries where such parties were permitted, and Marxists had become prominent among black intellectuals on several continents. The disillusionment of the 1930s, the uneasy cooperation of the war years and the enmity of the 1950s had thus been replaced by coexistence, alliance and even identity of Pan Africanism and Marxism. This essay is intended to explore the relationship between Pan Africanism and Marxism by reconsidering the nature of Pan Africanism. The exploration is undertaken from a materialist perspective which focuses, in particular, on the approach of black leaders toward their role in the evolving capitalist economic order.

The voluminous writings on Pan Africanism have concentrated on it as a movement with ideological origins and political aims. The roots in New World and old, the response to racial discrimination, the series of conferences, the development of political thought, the problems of new nations — all these have been investigated in broad and interesting detail, but rarely have the analysts ventured beyond the frontiers of politics and ideology. Thus, in those interpretations which have had most influence in the literture on Pan-Africanism in Africa, George Shepperson emphasized the Afro-American contributions to Pan-African thought, Imanuel Geiss distinguished rational (i.e. modernizing) from irrational (i.e. nostalgic) Pan-African thought, J. Ayodele Langley focused on ideologies of liberation within the tradition of Pan-African

political thought, and P. Olisanwuche Esedebe attempted to draw the focus away from the ideas of colonizers to those of Africans.[2]

The clearest exception to this interpretive trend is Ian Duffield, who advanced a contrary and more economically oriented approach to Pan-Africanism.[3] Documenting the involvement of Pan-African leaders in projects for railways, shipping, air travel, commodity trading, and banking and finance, he argued generally for the importance of economic factors in Pan-Africanism. My approach, in what follows, extends this line of reasoning. But where Duffield focused on the technical and infrastructural dimension of economic change and "modernization," I will focus on the social locus of economic change.[4] In particular, I will treat most Pan-African leaders as representatives of an aspiring black bourgeoisie.

Pan-Africanism in the 19th and 20th centuries was not so much about vague dreams of unity as it was about concrete economic projects designed to serve the needs of identifiable social interests. This is not to deny the importance of political philosophy, political mobilization, or cultural pride, but it is to suggest that behind these sentiments and activities lay systematic economic motives. In setting forth this outlook on Pan-Africanism, I draw the largest number of my examples from the West African coast, and supplement these with examples from other parts of Africa and the Diaspora. The main thrust of my argument can be summarized in six theses.

1. Pan-Africanism began as bourgeois nationalism. The movement came to life in the 19th century, expressing the aspirations of would-be black capitalist classes to gain power in modern national units that would support their economic interests. As such, it was a close parallel to 19th century bourgeois nationalist movements that shook the globe from Europe to the Americas to Asia. Bourgeois nationalism has remained a significant thread in Pan-Africanism to this day.

2. Bourgeois black nationalism took an intercontinental and racial form (that is, Pan-Africanism), rather than a more localized national form, as a response to racial discrimination. The material basis for Pan-African ideology lay not so much in the underlying unity of blacks as in the uniformity of their rejection and repression by whites. The experiences of slavery, colonial rule, and racial segregation provided the common fate that engendered a common faith: the most effective black response to these pervasive restrictions lay at the Pan-African level.

3. Once Pan-Africanism came to provide a potential focus of identity and loyalty for black people, contending black interest groups (who may be classified as bourgeois, proletarians, and peasants) entered struggles to control the vision and the symbols of Pan-Africanism, and defined the movement to suit their interests. In particular, what Cedric J. Robinson has called "the black radical tradition" asserted a proletarian

and subaltern approach to Pan-Africanism in the aftermath to World War I.[5] Just as French bourgeois, artisans and even monarchists sought to appropriate the symbols of the French nation into the service of their own socioeconomic needs, so did contending black interests seek to control and interpret the symbols of Pan-Africanism.

4. Pan-Africanism took on populist forms at times of cross-class unity and collaboration. The first great manifestation of black populism was Marcus Garvey's UNIA which, from the cauldron of hopes and disappointments left bubbling in the aftermath of World War I, rallied peasant and proletarian masses to a progam defined by an aspiring business class. A second and greater wave of populism is more commonly known as African socialism, a common rallying cry in the years soon after African independence.

5. Pan-Africanism took the form of revolutionary nationalism in cases where black workers, peasants, and their intellectual spokesmen rose to prominence. The revolutionary nationalism strand of Pan-Africanism became visible in the interwar years through the pronouncements and activities of such leaders as George Padmore and Garan Kouyaté, but it became far more evident in postwar years as an expression of the aspirations of black peasant and proletarian classes to gain power in a modern national unit that would restrict or eliminate the capitalistic economy.

6. The mercurial relationship between Pan-Africanism and Marxism is explained, to a large extent, by variations in the importance of working class representation in the Pan-African movement, and by changes in the relative importance of class and national divisions in social conflicts. Pan-Africanism and Marxism had nothing to do with one another until there were significant numbers of black wage workers. Since then the two have been in concord in times when representatives of each agreed to emphasize both class and national aspirations of blacks; in times of discord Pan-Africanists have accused Marxists of underestimating the importance of the national question for blacks, while Marxists have accused Pan-Africanists of neglecting black workers or the larger interests of the working class.

These theses outline a story to be told in the development and transformation of Pan-Africanism. In the remainder of this study I shall tell the story at somewhat greater length. The recounting of this story is made somewhat complex because it cannot be restricted to a narrow geographical terrain or to a continuously related group of protagonists. Yet this is precisely the point which must be made in order to sustain the theses: that black political thought of the 19th and 20th centuries, while enunciated by figures on all the continents and islands bordering on the Atlantic, is rendered coherent by the recurrence of themes and debates, and by an evolution of its reasoning in accord with the changing social and economic realities experienced by people of African descent.

PAN-AFRICANISM AS NATIONALISM

Black nationalism crystallized in the same crucible that brought modern nationalism generally into existence: the French revolution. And from the first, black nationalism was at once more localized and more universal in its loyalties than European nationalism.

In 1792, when an Austrian invasion threatened to extinguish the French revolution, the leaders of the National Convention called on all citizens of the nation to rise to its defense. Nationalism in revolutionary France was dominated at that time by the *sans-culottes*, the urban artisans who had the most to gain from a radical restructuring of French society, but thousands of peasants, small and large bourgeois and even some aristocrats took up arms and turned back the invaders. This was perhaps the most crucial moment in the evolution of modern nationalism, an ideology linking people of widely varying social origins and interests in devotion to the principle of a nation uniting them as a historical community.[6]

In 1791, the slaves of St. Domingue entered the field of revolutionary struggle, and under Toussaint L'Ouverture they came to dominate that field and win their freedom. St. Domingue became in effect an autonomous commonwealth within the French realm, and its leaders partook of the outlook of French nationalism, celebrating the rights of man in accord with the universal pretensions of the French revolution. Even the conflicts within revolutionary St. Domingue may be explained in terms analogous to those that explain revolutionary France: the ex-slaves sought to settle down as independent peasants on their own land, as did peasants in France, while Toussaint saw the future of the island in terms of the development of a national economy, and was willing to reestablish the plantation system in order to sustain industries and generate state revenue.[7]

The French revolution owed much to the precedents derived from the American revolution and from the English revolutions of the 17th century. In each of these revolutions, political change was broadly linked to economic change, and to the development of capitalism in particular. The correlation of nationalism and capitalism was to continue through the 19th and 20th centuries. The idea of the nation, and of the legal equality of all citizens within it, encouraged the spread of freedom from economic restrictions within the nation, yet permitted protection of the national economy from foreign competition.

French nationalism, in turn, stimulated the growth of other national identities. The key early statements of German nationalism, by Fichte and Herder, came in the era of German occupation by Napoleon's armies.[8] A more dramatic reaction to Napoleon's imperial version of French nationalism was the creation of the Haitian nation out of St.-Domingue. In 1802, after the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon's armies

occupied St.-Domingue and exiled Toussaint to France. The next intended step was the reinstitution of slavery, but word of this plan brought a rebellion so ferocious that by the end of 1803 armies under Dessalines and Christophe had driven the French from the island forever. On January 1, 1804, the republic and the nation of Haiti were formally declared, and the white stripe was symbolically ripped out of the tricolor to provide Haiti's first national flag of red and blue.

Other nationalisms arose in the 19th century, guided by various leading strata. In Russia, nationalistic thought was dominated by the state and the aristocracy; in Bohemia it was led by artisans. Overall, however, the class that most consistently led in and benefited from the ideology of nationalism was the bourgeoisie. This class sought to achieve control of a state by a nation, and sought to have the state build the economy, protect the interests of nationals as against foreign economic interests, and establish a balance of class interests within the nation. All this was in the context of the rapid growth of the industrial and commercial economy of the 19th century world.

Black leaders in Africa and the Americas sought too to participate in and benefit from the economic growth of the era. They rapidly enunciated the hope of forming a nation or nations. The problem was that their nationalist project would have to be carried out under conditions where millions of black people remained in slavery, or in a state of poverty and dependence following their emancipation. Haiti had become free, a powerful symbol of the potential of black nationhood, but remained isolated, ridiculed, and minimized by the world's great powers. Black leaders, however much effort they might put into building their political power in any one locality, had to keep track of the Pan-African dimension.

Martin Delany's writings in the 1850s reveal clearly the mixture of motives and methods in early black nationalism. He sought to end slavery and to elevate all black people into a position where they would be eligible for citizenship: his trip to Africa in 1860 was intended to stimulate production of cotton which, he hoped, would undercut the economy of the American South. He sought to build black nations, and he sought to build black business enterprise. Africa, to become regenerated, must have a national character, and her position among the existing nations of the earth will depend mainly upon the high standard she may gain compared with them in all her relations, morally, religiously, socially, politically, and commercially.[9]

While Delany argued vigorously that black nations should be built with black resources alone, many other early black nationalists thought that white individuals and nations were interested enough in the advancement of economy and society in general to provide disinterested assistance in the expansion of black nations. Edward W. Blyden (born in the Danish West Indies) and Alexander Crummell (of the United States)

settled on Liberia as the relevant base for the advancement of black nationhood. Africanus Horton sought to build black nationhood from a base in his native Sierra Leone. Blyden, Crummell, and Horton all assumed that black nations could be built up without antagonism to whites, though they were quite clear on their antagonism both to slavery and to racial discrimination. The sum total of their early work was a world-wide strategy for African nationhood. Since the campaign was against slavery and racism, both of which were defined not in national but in global terms, the logical dimension of their response was Pan-African in breadth. While they were weak politically and while their tactics shifted rapidly with changing circumstances, their strategic vision of the creation of modern black nations was remarkably prescient. The implementation of their plan, however, had to wait nearly a century because of European intervention.

A COLONIAL STRATEGY FOR THE NATIONAL VISION: THE ASPIRING BLACK BOURGEOISIE, 1880-1920

From about 1880, the European powers suddenly began rapid territorial expansion in Africa. Recent scholarship has done much to elucidate the importance of local factors in this imperial expansion, but the black leaders who had been seeking to create modern black nations were surprised and unprepared for this sudden European initiative. The result of this development was to force a significant change of strategy on the fledgling black nationalist movement, for black leaders were henceforth limited to being accessories to white rule, rather than rulers in their own right. Analogous developments took place at much the same time in the British West Indies, where the imposition of Crown Colony government in the 1870s removed any hope of black home rule, and in the American South, where the end of Reconstruction led rapidly to disenfranchisement of blacks.[10]

The new strategy enunciated by aspiring black bourgeois was one of alliance with colonialism. Black leaders assumed that a good-faith alliance could be maintained in which white authorities would provide trusteeship for their black charges, and ease the modernization of their societies. The adjustment in thinking can be seen in the writings of E. W. Blyden, who in 1862 had written that, "An African nationalist is our great need. . . . We shall never receive the respect of other races until we establish a powerful nationality. We should not content ourselves living among other races, simply by their permission or their endurance. . . . We must build up negro states."[11] By the early 1880s, he was calling for British occupation of large tracts of Africa in order to suppress slave trade, and in 1895 he celebrated imperial conquest with apparent disregard for racial identity: "France, in the conquest of Dahomey, has performed a task which civilization has long needed. She has freed a

great country from the cruel savagery of ages and thrown it open to the regenerating influence of enlightened nations."[12]

In America the rise of Booker T. Washington from 1895 provides perhaps the best known example of the accommodationism characteristic of this period.[13] In Gold Coast, the teacher and lawyer J. E. Casely Hayford wrote eloquently and insightfully of the constitutional systems of the Asante and Fante portions of the British colony, arguing that they should be allowed to evolve toward responsible government and a broad franchise in the same fashion as had the mother country.[14] Here was a skillful attempt to link the development of black nations to an alliance with enlightened Europeans. Behind this political argument lay a more complex but more important argument about land rights. By opposing the British government's claim to a right of eminent domain over all Gold Coast lands, Casely Hayford's argument took the form of a defense of inherited tribal rights, but it had the substance of defending the rights of land-owners to buy and sell land and other resources according to their own calculations of profit and loss, rather than be subjected to government regulation.[15] The combination of Casely Hayford's arguments on land and constitutional issues provide strong evidence that his was a bourgeois nationalist approach, though it was constrained within the need to be a loyal colonial subject.

The emergence of such a strategy took a somewhat sharper form in Dahomey. There the French conquered the old kingdom of Danhomè: its last king, Behanzin, has since become a national hero, but his outlook had far more to do with monarchism than with modern nationalism. But the French met with some Dahomean allies who followed a strategy that fits neatly with the notion of an aspiring bourgeois nationalist alliance with colonialism. Leaders of the two greatest landowning families of the coastal town of Ouidah, the Quénum and Adjovi families, rallied to the French during the war of conquest. For over a decade, these families achieved their goals of accumulating lands and building their fortunes in alliance with the colonial state. But between 1903 and 1910, the French government, fearing these families to be too strong, broke the alliance, halted their accumulation of land, and began actively to break the families into fractions.[16]

Similar experiences happened all over the black world, and particularly at the turn of the 20th century. Racial discrimination had reached a new high. Jim Crow laws in the United States corresponded to residential segregation in African towns, and to the systematic demotion of blacks who had achieved high rank in government service, the clergy, and business.

Up until about 1920, the dominant trend among black bourgeois leaders was to reassert their fidelity to the notions of progress, economic advancement and high culture, in hopes that their dependability would overcome the incomprehensible white discrimination along racial lines.

In the case of the Adjovi and Quénum families, this took the form of devotion to France in war, to obtaining French citizenship and education, all the while keeping an eye on the maintenance of the family fortune.

In Gold Coast, a remarkable case on the economic front is that of Chief Alfred Sam, who sought to open a shipping line between the United States and West Africa and who, when his efforts were frustrated mainly by American and British governments, turned to the recruitment of discouraged black Oklahoma farmers whose string of political defeats caused many of them to become ready to migrate to Africa. A few actually did arrive and settle in Gold Coast, despite systematic government harrassment. The reputation and business credentials of Chief Sam were impugned at every turn, and only in recent research has it been possible to document the solidity of his background.[17] The business orientation of both Chief Sam and his clients supports the conclusion that they were involved in a bourgeois enterprise rather than in romantic idealism.

As Chief Sam's Pan-African business venture experienced a downturn, Casely Hayford launched a great political initiative. The National Congress of British West Africa included leaders from the British colonies of Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast and Nigeria. The goal of the congress, stated cautiously and indirectly, was to make British West Africa a dominion along the lines of Canada, Australia, and South Africa, remaining within the British empire, but with political power being extended progressively to blacks. The well-financed delegation of the congress to London (which followed a model of representation that had succeeded twice before in Gold Coast) arrived in 1920, and thus after the closing of the Versailles peace conference. The British government delayed action on the proposal, and then the governor of Nigeria, Sir Hugh Clifford, unilaterally created a legislative council restricted to the colony of Nigeria, thus effectively balkanizing the proposed union.[18] The National Congress of British West Africa expired almost immediately.

The bourgeois strategy of alliance with colonialism, adopted out of necessity at the time of Europe's last great imperial expansion, had shown itself by 1920 to have no remaining possibilities as a means to the establishment of modern black nations.

REKINDLED HOPES AND NEW RECRIMINATIONS: BOURGEOIS NATIONALISM, POPULISM, AND MARXISM, 1920-1945

The race riots of postwar United States did as much as anything to bring an alternative strategy for nationhood into existence. The widespread rage in the new communities of blacks in the American North, assaulted by whites with whom they competed for jobs and housing, provided the support which led to the growth of Marcus

Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association. Robert Hill has described the success of the Garvey movement as a combination of West Indian self-confidence and American race consciousness.[19] The movement also combined the experience of a producerite ex-printer relying on 19th century artisanal values, with the dreams of achieving the success and fortune of an aspiring bourgeois. The movement had a genuinely populist character in that its national symbolism managed for several years to link wage earners and business interests into a common structure, but with the passage of time the inherent conflicts came to dominate, and to ease the work of the U.S. government in prosecuting Garvey and breaking down the organization.[20]

The term "populist" is somewhat problematic in a discussion of nationalism, of course, in that any nationalistic ideology seeks to create unity across class lines. But when the language of the movement provides an explicit place in the sun for distinct social classes, it may be seen as populist, in contrast with bourgeois nationalism which presents the interests of the business class as those of the nation, or revolutionary nationalism which presents the interests of workers as those of the nation. The UNIA, by this reasoning, was populist in its rhetoric, but bourgeois in its practical orientation — a pattern common to that of many populist movements. One measure of the strength of race consciousness in the Garvey movement was that W.E.B. Du Bois condemned it as one likely to bring about racial retaliation by whites; that is, Du Bois had not yet given up on the bourgeois nationalist strategy of advancing blacks in alliance with sympathetic white authorities.

The logic of populism went beyond the *Negro World* and the pageantry of UNIA conventions. For instance, the populist national movement of Dahomey emerged during the 1920s and 1930s. There, representatives of the Quénum and Adjovi families and other merchant and planter interests carried on a vigorous campaign for reform of colonial policy, relying on newspapers, on electoral politics (limited to the election of three members of the colony's administrative council), and on mobilizations and demonstrations. The bourgeois faction experienced success in the years from 1927 to 1933 with its newspaper, *La Voix du Dahomey*, and with the election of candidates in opposition to those supported by the administration. The movement achieved its goal by enunciating popular complaints against taxation, chiefly abuses, and the like, and linking these to the demands of the bourgeoisie for greater governmental support of local business.[21]

Meanwhile, one of their number who had lived and been schooled in France since 1900, Kojo Marc Tovalou-Houénou (or Quénum), became an outstanding, transnational spokesman for black nationalism in the mid-1920s. He visited the U.S. in 1924-25, addressed the UNIA convention, and traveled as far as Chicago. His association with Marcus Garvey marked him, however, and he was soon discredited

and marginalized by the French colonial administration and the metropolitan police.[22] Though Tovalou-Houénou was a brilliant writer and speaker, certain inconsistencies or rapid changes became evident in his rhetoric. He took the title "prince" when it was not precisely justified. In the course of disputes within his family, his arguments ranged from attempts to rally the peasant masses to assertion of his royal prerogative or his familial rights as the eldest son. This apparent alternation among political principles shows up among other political figures of the time.

The Dahomean national movement, meanwhile, foundered on the rocks of depression and class conflict in 1933 and 1934. In the 1934, administrative council elections, a strange combination of the administration and its chief clientele with transport and other workers, civil servants and smaller businessmen, joined to stigmatize the *Voix du Dahomey* group as bourgeois exploiters. The more "radical" candidates won the election, only to become tools of the administration as soon as they were seated. The *Voix* group launched what seemed like a comeback, but never succeeded. In the course of these years, a fundamental change in the consensus of Dahomean merchants and planters was achieved by the impact of French policy: up to that time, the Dahomean bourgeoisie preferred the dominance of the private sector over the public. But from that time on, the bourgeoisie accepted the colonial argument that the interests of the state came first, and those of the domestic economy later, and Dahomean bourgeois leaders remained consistent thereafter in emphasizing the primacy of the public sector in the economy.

Revolutionary nationalism and proletarian consciousness, of which we have just seen faint glimmers in Dahomey, came to play a role globally in black affairs during the 1920s. The black Marxists emerged out of the American working class movement by the end of World War I, and it was in this atmosphere that George Padmore became a Marxist. Garan Kouyaté, born in French Soudan, worked and studied in Paris, and learned his Marxism in the expatriate colonial community there during the 1920s. Padmore rose rapidly with the American Communist Party, then moved to Moscow and to the Communist International; Kouyaté carried out his activities in Paris and in organizations devoted specifically to colonial activities, though as a member of the French Communist Party. Later, in the 1930s, I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson of Sierra Leone was active in labor organization, also as a Marxist.[23]

For these figures, the conjunction of race and class consciousness defined their viewpoint. They sought to advance the cause of black workers, both as workers and as blacks. This involved them inevitably in Pan-African schemes. The involvement in Pan-Africanism brought them, equally inevitably, into conflict with bourgeois Pan-Africanists and with Marxists who accorded less significance to

national and racial identity than they did. One by one, these revolutionary Pan-Africanists broke with Marxist political parties, but carried on their political activities much as before. One may usefully set these political activists alongside such literary figures as Ralph Ellison and Richard Wright, whose novels depict the mutual attraction and the repulsion of Marxism, black workers, and black intellectuals.[24]

A simplified explanation of this split runs as follows: during the Russian Revolution and in its immediate aftermath, Bolshevik support for national self-determination provided great hopes for anti-colonial black leaders. The alliance between black liberation and Marxism was founded in the 1920s on the basis of a balanced Soviet policy supporting both proletarian revolution and national democratic revolution. The development of Stalin's policy of socialism in one country led, however, to a communist focus on Soviet national interest. This in turn led to an accommodation with the capitalist powers: in 1933 the Soviets were admitted to the League of Nations and opened diplomatic relations with the U.S. and western European powers. As a *quid pro quo*, the Soviets cut back on support for anti-colonial movements. According to this interpretation, black revolutionary nationalists such as Padmore and Kouyaté, facing betrayal of their programs, struggled against the new party line and in the course of their disputations either quit or were expelled.[25]

In fact, the chronology does not admit of such a simple interpretation, though the shifts identified in Soviet policy can be documented clearly enough. Rather than black activists leaving all at once because of a single betrayal, radical blacks seem to have joined, stayed in, and left communist parties in a succession of waves from the 1920s to the 1990s. In the Depression era, for instance, events of the early 1930s sharpened the conflict between classes, but the rising threat of fascism in the middle and late 1930s brought new efforts for class unity and a new attractiveness for links between Marxism and radical Pan-Africanism. This was the period of greatest activity of Wallace-Johnson, Wright, and Ellison. It was also the period of publication of two great historical works that were to provide grounding for the black radical tradition: W. E. B. Du Bois's *Black Reconstruction* and C. L. R. James's *The Black Jacobins*.[26]

As the number of black workers rose, and as these workers sought to enunciate their own concept of the black nation, it was natural that revolutionary ideology and Marxism in particular should become attractive to some workers and intellectuals. But while Marxism had shown itself able to fit with nationalism in some cases — that of Russia, and perhaps those of Germany, Italy, and France — Marxism did not yet fit with black nationalism. The awkward and belated call of the Communist Party – USA for a black homeland in the American South is emblematic both of the effort to make Marxism consistent with black

nationalism and of the failure of that effort. Black and white Marxists in the interwar years campaigned systematically for black self-determination and against racism, but they failed to identify the specific class composition of black communities, and to identify the specific effects of racial discrimination. In the words of Richard Wright:

> That the Africans, West Indians and American Negroes have flirted with Communism is undeniably true, but just as true is the sad fact that in almost every instance the black victim discovered that he was not serving his own interests when he was caught in the Stalinist coils.[27]

Wright's statement, based on his own disillusionment with Marxism, emphasizes issues that might be called cultural. Cedric Robinson, writing half a century later, restates this troubled relationship between black radicals and Marxism in terms of differing analyses of political economy:

> For Black radicals, historically and immediately linked to social bases predominantly made up of peasants and farmers in the West Indies, or sharecroppers and peons in North America, or forced laborers on colonial plantations in Africa, Marxism appeared distracted from the cruelest and most characteristic manifestations of the world economy.[28]

Radical, populist, and bourgeois strands of Pan-Africanism fought bitterly against each other in the interwar years, and appeared to have exhausted each other by the end of the 1930s. On the other hand, despite the depths of dispute, there were also reasons to form alliances across the differences: the shifting alliances among Pan-Africanists of various stripes would continue to be prominent in the political scene to the end of the 20th century. It was the anti-fascist campaign of World War II, the class unity and espousal of democratic principles of all participants in the Grand Alliance, that gave Pan-Africanists of many viewpoints the courage to raise their sights again.[29]

NATIONAL REDEMPTION ON THE HORIZON: POPULIST, BOURGEOIS, AND REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM, 1945-1975

The Fifth Pan-African Conference, the Manchester Conference, was held in October 1945, and was timed to follow immediately the initial meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions. In one sense, it can be said that Du Bois passed the Pan-African baton on to George Padmore and Kwame Nkrumah at this historic juncture. Africans, rather than West Indians and Americans, dominated this meeting. Kwame Nkrumah came to the fore as the energetic man willing to carry on the

day-to-day work of the secretariat, and he rapidly turned his administrative energies into a position of political leadership The scope of this meeting (as of so many other meetings in 1945 and 1946) was world-wide.[30]

Within two years, however, Nkrumah and Padmore had opted for a national tactic within the Pan-African strategy: the strength of the national movement in Gold Coast encouraged Nkrumah to accept a position as head of the secretariat for the Gold Coast political party, UGCC. Within a year of his return to Gold Coast, he had become head of his own political party and the dominant political figure in the country: in 1951, after his party won an electoral victory while he was imprisoned, he was escorted by Governor Sir Charles Arden-Clarke in the historic walk from prison to the government house at Christianborg Castle, where he became Head of Government Business.[31]

Pan-Africanism had now come to mean African nationalism, with the ideal of broader political unity being postponed once again. Such a vision of black national destiny was not necessarily a contradiction to Pan-Africanism, though several observers have seen it as such.[32] Black leaders had repeated for over a century their desire to have a nation, without setting further restrictions as to the dimensions of that nation. Still, the Pan-African search for a national existence had eventually to run into this divide, and it was resolved unambiguously (if not irretrievably) in favor of small national states with the decolonization of Africa and the Caribbean.

In another important postwar African political movement, Félix Houphouët-Boigny and his Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI) used a political alliance with the French Communist Party and a heavy reliance on their organizational forms to build a powerful political base, while the substance of the party was dominated by wealthy planters. He maintained this alliance even after the Cold War broke out, survived French colonial efforts to repress the movement, and then made a deal — an alliance between his party and the centrist French regime on terms acceptable to both. Looking to later times, one may label this accommodation as the harbinger of the characteristic neo-colonial policy of independent Ivory Coast. Looking to earlier times, one may note that the bourgeois leaders of the Dahomean national movement were seeking exactly such a deal in the 1920s and 1930s, but lacked the strength to force it. Houphouët, meanwhile, found the limits to his Pan-Africanism early on. While he became widely celebrated in 1946 as the man who led in abolishing forced labor in French colonies, and while his RDA extended all across French West Africa, he was quite willing to take responsibility in 1956 for balkanizing that federation. The loi-cadre he supported broke up French West Africa, and thus eliminated the central government in Dakar that might have set restrictions on the revenue or the policy of his Ivory Coast base.[33]

Thus, while Pan-Africanism sprung to life as never before in postwar Africa, the range was restricted to bourgeois and populist Pan-Africanism. Nkrumah, for instance, continued to keep his radical Pan-Africanism distinct from Marxism: even when, after 1962, he announced a socialist economic policy for Ghana, he emphasized his own personal philosophy, "consciencism," as the solution to Africa's ideological needs.[34] The populist rhetoric of Nkrumah, Milton Obote, Obafemi Awolowo, and Ahmed Sékou Touré contrasted with the more cautiously bourgeois Houphouët, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and a somewhat chastened Jomo Kenyatta. The differences in these approaches led to debates and recriminations for a while, but all found a way in 1963 to come together in the Organization for African Unity.

The revival of revolutionary nationalism came from quite a different direction: from Algeria. The Algerian war of national liberation, fought between 1954 and 1962, was the first successful such war fought on African soil. The war brought great prominence to its theorist, the Martinican psychiatrist cum newspaper editor, Frantz Fanon. Fanon's writings began by focusing on the psychology of racism. Sent by France as a doctor in Algeria during the war, he went over to the rebels and then turned to writing political analysis. The total impact of his work is much more than this, however. In social terms, he constructed a class analysis giving particular attention to the role of peasants, and he articulated their outlook and their potential with dramatic (and probably exaggerated) clarity. In political terms, he became the theorist of the antithesis between colonialism and the colonized. In ideological terms, he integrated the analysis of racism into his schema. In intellectual terms, his contribution was his synthesis of Freud and Marx.[35]

In another sense, Fanon's work was merely a reflection of the revival of revolutionary nationalism, rather than the cause of it. The practical and theoretical analysis of the peasantry in Marxist-led revolution had been worked out for the case of China under Mao Zedong. The combination of a peasant movement and an anti-colonial struggle had been carried on successfully for the case of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh — who had worked with many of the early African activists in Paris during the 1920s. But Fanon's formulation of the problem of Third World revolution, while not exactly in a Pan-African form, transformed the essentials of Marxism into a form that sprouted readily in Africa and the Diaspora. To earlier formulations of black nationalism, he added a rationale for violent struggle against colonialism and a justification of black nations in terms of their future rather than their past. The fact is that in guerilla warfare the struggle no longer concerns the place where you are, but the place where you are going. Each fighter carries his warring country between his bare toes.[36] By the late 1960s the American Black Panthers had found his writings to be a

guide to political action in the U.S., in sharp contrast to the government-supported efforts to stimulate black capitalism.

While the Algerian revolution remained populist in its official ideology, the succeeding African national liberation movements tended to take on an explicitly Marxist ideology. This was the case for the leading movements of Guiné-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, and to a lesser degree that of Zimbabwe. In a final twist, governments coming to power not through social movements but through military coups also declared for a Marxian ideology, as in Bénin, Congo, and Ethiopia: here the substance behind Marxist rhetoric seemed not very different from that behind the African socialism of the 1960s. But in any case, an essential point had been passed: Marxism had now become consistent with black nationalism.

This emergence of a viable tradition of revolutionary Pan-Africanism did not mean that bourgeois and populist traditions were thereby displaced. The great weight of Nigeria in Pan-African affairs and the continuing strength of Nigerian devotion to capitalism are sufficient in themselves to demonstrate the importance of bourgeois Pan-Africanism. The situation by 1975 had become one where Pan-African identity was perhaps as strong as it had ever been, but where three contending formulations of Pan-Africanism each remained on the field. In addition, Marxist Angola, populist Tanzania and bourgeois Zambia were able to cooperate in supporting the liberation of southern Africa, if with only minimal success.

THE FUTURE OF PAN-AFRICANISM

In the 19th century formative years of Pan-Africanism, it was slavery – or rather black determination to end slavery as a necessary step toward the creation of modern black nations – that brought into existence the Pan-African framework of analysis and action. By the turn of the 20th century, racism and colonialism had surpassed slavery as factors that required a Pan-African framework. After another century, at the beginning of the 21st century, one finds slavery formally abolished, colonialism all but ended, and racism universally condemned thought still a factor in practice. One may wonder whether Pan-Africanism will now fade away along with the forms of oppression that brought it into existence.

With some 40 black-dominated nations in existence in the 1980s, the Pan-African ideal in its strongest form — the political unity of all black peoples — was consumed on one side by growing national identity within each of these states, and on another side by a growing Third World identity linking the political fates of blacks to those of Latin Americans and Asians. Black nationalism itself continued to be formulated in many conflicting fashions. So, there was not as strong an external imperative for black emphasis on Pan-Africanism as there had

been in past times, and such reasoning might have led one to expect a declining significance for Pan-Africanism.

On the other hand, black peoples all around the Atlantic were the inheritors of over a century of political and cultural experience shared ever more closely. If it was true in 1800 that black peoples shared no common cultural heritage, it was less so in the late 20th century. Any study of black music must emphasize the remarkable interchange and convergence of musical forms, meters, lyrics, and orchestration which opened up new connections and a new commonality for Africa and the Diaspora. The tremendous success of Jamaican reggae is only the most obvious of examples; reggae, in turn, developed out of Rastafarianism, the Jamaican religious and social movement that grew up based on dreams of Ethiopia. Exploration of other cultural threads will show, similarly, expansion in the cultural links among people of African descent.

The social basis of Pan-Africanism is thus now changing in that it is based as much on an internal unity as on external oppression. Meanwhile, external pressures continue to contribute to development of the common experience, if less spectacularly than before. The decolonization of Africa appeared for a time to have focused Pan-Africanism solely on the African continent: the Organization for African Unity became the leading Pan-African institution. But the emergence of new conflicts, and the near-desperate attempts to achieve national development under conditions of poverty and dependence, served to broaden the scope of Pan-Africanism once again. Cuba relied explicitly on a Pan-African rationale for sending troops in defense of the governments of Ethiopia and Angola; the New Jewel Movement which came to power in Grenada under Maurice Bishop adopted a Pan-African stance; and the struggle for liberation in South Africa provided a continuing focus for Pan-African sentiment.

The events of the 1990s shifted the balance of Pan-African sentiment sharply. Democratization movements in Africa and the collapse of the Soviet Union did much to undermine Afro-Marxist regimes and to replace them with an emphasis on economic liberalism and what would earlier have been called a bourgeois outlook. In the same period, however, the South African Communist Party maintained its existence and its alliance with the African National Congress, and became part of the governing coalition from 1994. In the same period that Marxism lost many adherents among people of Africa and the Diaspora, a substantial upwelling of Pan-African identity became evident in Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, and Cuba.[37] Pan-Africanism, although it appears in contending bourgeois, populist, and revolutionary guises, and although it fluctuates in its strength and direction, remains a significant force in a world where the correlation of capitalism and nationalism has yet to be superseded by other principles of organization.

NOTES

[1] George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa* (New York, 1956); James B. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary: George Padmore's Path from Communism to Pan-Africanism* (London, 1967).

[2] George Shepperson, "Notes on Negro American Influences on the Emergence of African Nationalism," *Journal of African History* 1 (1960), 299-312; Imanuel Geiss, *The Pan-African Movement: A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe, and Africa*, trans. Ann Keep (New York, 1974); J. Ayodele Langley, ed., *Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa, 1856-1970: Documents on Modern African Political Thought from Colonial Times to the Present* (London, 1979); P. Olisanwuche Esedebe, *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776-1963* (Washington, DC, 1982); Ronald Walters, *Pan Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern Afrocentric Political Movements* (Detroit, 1993).

[3] Ian Duffield, "Pan-Africanism, Rational and Irrational," *Journal of African History* 18 (1977), 597-620.

[4] This is not the first attempt to explain Pan-Africanism in socio-economic terms. With regard to Marcus Garvey, for instance, see Robert A. Hill, "General Introduction," in Hill, ed., The *Marcus Garvey and UNIA Papers*, Vol. 1 (Berkeley, 1983), xxxv-lxxxviii; and Judith Stein, *The World of Marcus Garvey* (Baton Rouge, 1986).

[5] Robinson, in a wide-ranging and insightful, explores what he calls the "roots" and the "historical archaeology" of the black radical tradition, centering on the history of slavery and the struggles to overcome it. For the black radical tradition itself, he concentrates on the development of black Marxism among three intellectuals of the African Diaspora: W. E. B. Du Bois, C. L. R. James, and Richard Wright. Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (Chapel Hill, 2000 [first published 1983]). The present study addresses similar issues, but with a time frame reaching the end of the twentieth century and with attention to including the African continent in the discussion.

[6] Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origin and Background* (New York, 1944); Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, 1984).

[7] C.L.R. James, *The Black Jacobins* (New York, 1938); Eugene D. Genovese, *From Rebellion to Revolution* (Baton Rouge, 1979).

[8] Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism.*

[9] Martin R. Delany, *Official Report of the Niger Valley Exploring Party*, reprinted in Howard H. Bell, ed., *Search for a Place* (Ann Arbor, 1969), 111.

[10] Thomas C. Holt, *The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938* (Baltimore, 1992); W.E.B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction* (New York, 1935).

[11] Hollis R. Lynch, *Edward Wilmot Blyden, Pan-Negro Patriot, 1832-1912* (New York, 1967), 29-30.

[12] Lynch, *Blyden*, 193; Lynch, ed., *Black Spokesman: Selected Published Writings of Edward Wilmot Blyden* (London, 1971).

[13] Louis R. Harlan, *Booker T. Washington: The Making of a Black Leader, 1856-1901* (New York, 1972).

[14] J. E. Casely Hayford, *Gold Coast Native Institutions* (London, 1903).

[15] J. E. Casely Hayford, *The Truth About the West African Land Question* (London, 1913); David Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana* (Oxford, 1963).

[16] Patrick Manning, "L'Affaire Adjovi : la bourgeoisie foncière naissante au Dahomey, face à l'administration," in Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, ed., *Entreprises et entrepreneurs en Afrique*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1983), I:241-262.

[17] W. Bittle and G. Geis, T*he Longest Way Home: Chief Alfred D. Sam's Back-to-Africa Movement* (Detroit, 1964); "Chief Alfred Sam," in Robert A. Hill, ed., *The Marcus Garvey and UNIA Papers*, vol. 1 (Berkeley, 1983), 536-547.

[18] J. Ayodele Langley, *Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945* (Oxford, 1973).

[19] Hill, "General Introduction," xxxvi.

[20] Stein, *World of Marcus Garvey*, 3-5.

[21] Patrick Manning, *Slavery, Colonialism, and Economic Growth in Dahomey, 1640-1960* (Cambridge, 1982), 261-275.

[22] James S. Spiegler, "Aspects of Nationalist Thought among French-Speaking West Africans, 1921-1939" (Ph.D. thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford University, 1968), 50-80.

[23] Spiegler, "Aspects of Nationalist Thought"; Geiss, Pan-African Movement, 335-339.

[24] Ralph Ellison, *Invisible Man* (New York, 1947); Richard Wright, *Native Son* (New York, 1940).

[25] Geiss, Pan-African Movement, 338.

[26] W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880* (New York, 1935); C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins* (London, 1938). See also Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 185-286.

[27] Richard Wright, *Black Power: A Record of Reactions in a Land of Pathos* (New York, 1954).

[28] Robinson, *Black Marxism*, xxx.

[29] Ras Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within* (London, 1965).

[30] Ibid.

[31] Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?;* Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (New York, 1963).

[32] Elenga M'buyinga, *Pan-Africanism or Neo-colonialism? The Bankruptcy of the O.A.U.* (London, 1982)

[33] Aristide Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton, 1964); Patrick Manning, *Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880-1995*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1998).

[34] Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and Development with Particular Reference to the African Revolution* (New York, 1964).

[35] Frantz Fanon, *Black Skins, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York, 1991; first published 1952); Fanon, *Studies in a Dying Colonialism*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (London, 1989; first published 1959); Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York, 1968; first published 1961).

[36] Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, 134-135.

[37] Nina de Friedemann, "Proyecto: Puente Africa America en la Ruta de Esclava," Studies in the World History of Slavery, Abolition and Emancipation 1 (1996), www.h-net.msu.edu/~slavery.