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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND WORLD-SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION

*Edited by Jackie Smith, Michael Goodhart,
Patrick Manning and John Markoff*

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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND WORLD-SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION

At a particularly urgent world-historical moment, this volume brings together some of the leading researchers of social movements and global social change, and other emerging scholars and practitioners, to advance new thinking about social movements and global transformation. Social movements around the world today are responding to crisis by defying both political and epistemological borders, offering alternatives to the global capitalist order that are imperceptible through the modernist lens. Informed by a world-historical perspective, contributors explain today's struggles as building upon the experiences of the past while also coming together globally in ways that are inspiring innovation and consolidating new thinking about what a fundamentally different, more equitable, just, and sustainable world order might look like.

This collection offers new insights into contemporary movements for global justice, challenging readers to appreciate how modernist thinking both colors our own observations and complicates the work of activists seeking to resolve inequities and contradictions that are deeply embedded in Western cultural traditions and institutions. Contributors consider today's movements in the *longue durée* – that is, they ask how Occupy Wall Street, the Arab Spring, and other contemporary struggles for liberation reflect, build upon, or diverge from anti-colonial and other emancipatory struggles of the past. Critical to this volume is its exploration of how divisions over gender equity and diversity of national cultures and class have impacted what are increasingly intersectional global movements.

The contributions of feminist and indigenous movements come to the fore in this collective exploration of what the movements of yesterday and today can contribute to our ongoing effort to understand the dynamics of global transformation in order to help advance a more equitable, just, and ecologically sustainable world.

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LINKING SOCIAL MOVEMENT NETWORKS, 1989–1992

Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America

Patrick Manning

This chapter explores the dynamics of social movements at a global scale. My underlying hypothesis is that social movements, arising out of local situations, periodically link up with each other so as to create aggregated social movements, occasionally with worldwide impact.¹ In addition, the aggregated social movements later decouple from each other through various processes, so that in sum the aggregated social movements expand and then decline. The processes of linkage and delinking are here studied through a narrative of the social movements of 1989–1990, with some reference to the succeeding two years. To emphasize that the links were genuinely global and not simply imposed by great powers, my narrative focuses on Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia rather than on Tiananmen, the Berlin Wall, and Soviet collapse.

The dynamic of linkage is but one of the major issues in analysis of global social movements. Most fundamentally, there is the question of the underlying cause of popular social contestation. For the movements of 1989 and 1990, the potential for social contestation arose especially out of demands for political democracy and an end to economic constraints, particularly among professionals and other educated strata, who were commonly able to make common cause with urban wage workers, rural commoners, and youth generally.² A second issue, long under discussion, is that of the spark launching the linkage of social movements. Lenin's newspaper *Iskra* or "Spark" adopted this metaphor. I have tinkered with other metaphors for the launching of social movements including that of song, in which the songs of one group encourage others to take up a similar refrain.

The process of progressive linkage among social movements, while it may not be the central issue, is in need of further study. The social movements, however they are launched, expand through alliances by class, ethnicity, gender, and other

social groupings. Symbolic communication is important in establishing the mutual identification among groups, so the various movements can imagine that they share common causes. In this way, out of the great pell-mell of diversity and complexity in human society, implicit or explicit coalitions of various social movements occasionally gain broader attention, especially if they appear to be achieving some of their objectives.³

As the social movements gain in strength and unity, the targeted elites and institutions seek a basis for response. They too turn from their ongoing campaigns to maintain local dominance and seek out alliances with other groupings that might enable them to weaken or eliminate the challenge of social movements. Out of the combination of these processes emerges a contestation between the emerging coalitions of social movements and the emerging alliance of established powers. Of course none of these processes starts from zero. All of the participants have developed allies and language from previous struggles over similar or related issues. The overall process of rise and decline in social contestation includes both innovation and re-enactment of previous episodes.

Marx's "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" is the most famous example of a short-term narrative of socio-political contestation in which social movements and elites shifted positions, expanded and contracted in alliances, until the wave of social movements had spent itself or simply been outmaneuvered. It was in this narrative that Marx developed the notion of the "lumpenproletariat" as strata among the dispossessed that nevertheless allied with the elite. Frantz Fanon later argued quite differently about the role of the lumpenproletariat in decolonization struggles. Both wrote their narratives in national perspective; the point of this analysis is to address global linkage of social movements.⁴

Prelude, 1979–1988

By the beginning of 1989, a world full of tensions and conflicts was susceptible to being galvanized into new directions. Three sets of events – on three continents – went a step further to prepare people in many countries to demand big changes. In Algeria, the Arab country with the strongest sense of national purpose because of its revolution against French rule, disillusioned students and city folk rose in late 1988 to demonstrate in protest against the frustration and stagnation in their lives. Whether socialist or fundamentalist in outlook, demonstrators listened to the rebellious *rai* music, a lively form of rock music that had grown up in North Africa and in immigrant communities in France. The initial government response was a direct and brutal repression. In early 1989, however, the government sought to release some of the pent-up pressures by introducing a plan for multi-party municipal elections. Thus were born new hopes for an extension of democratic rights.

Second, in Afghanistan, where Soviet troops had been engaged since 1979 in a war with some similarities to that of the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviet

government announced a unilateral withdrawal of its troops, which was completed on schedule by February 15, 1989. The Soviets sought to follow their withdrawal with a negotiated settlement to the war, but the Americans and their allies decided to press for a military solution. And third, in Poland, the governing Communist Party and the opposition Solidarity movement negotiated an arrangement for national elections that would ultimately lead to a change in power. Negotiations were completed in February, and the election campaign began in March.

These three developments suggested that powerful governments in unpopular positions could be induced, under certain conditions, to withdraw from their positions of crude domination and act in conciliatory fashion. These moves did not guarantee either peace or success to the opposition (the war continued in Afghanistan, and the government maintained the monopoly of power in Algeria), but they did open new hopes.

This brief interpretation of the world from 1979 to early 1989 relies heavily on hindsight. I have reassembled the events to highlight the threads of democratization as they began to cohere into a global movement. But before 1989, if some claimed to see a democratic momentum accumulating in the events of the 1980s, most saw nothing of the sort. Despite the range and connections of these events, it remained possible for people to interpret them as separate national phenomena, or to interpret them in terms of a bipolar Cold War confrontation between Americans and Soviets. Events in China from April to June of 1989 changed all that, and made it logical to speak of a world movement for democracy.

The events in China from April to June of 1989 raised enthusiasm for pro-democracy social movements, and then dashed them as the military cleared Tiananmen and the rest of Beijing of demonstrators on June 4. The case of Poland conveyed a somewhat different message. On the very day of the repression in Beijing, Poland held its parliamentary elections. In the complex arrangement negotiated earlier in the year, the Communist Party and other parties in its coalition were reserved a certain number of seats, but candidates allied with the Solidarity movement gained a majority in the election. Continuing the delicate compromise between rising and declining political forces, the Solidarity-dominated parliament then elected the communist Wojciech Jaruzelski to continue in office as president. The conciliation in Poland was as strong a contradiction to the message of Beijing as could be imagined. As time passed, it became clear that while the Chinese state could crush the movement for democratization within its borders, it had not crushed the sense of global community that gave birth to the Chinese events, then took inspiration from them.

In South America, the slow transition from military dictatorship to elected government passed three important steps in the spring of 1989. In Chile, preparations for the first presidential election since 1970 brought nomination of Patricio Aylwin of the Christian Democrats as the main opposition candidate; in Argentina the second presidential election since the military regime brought

Carlos Saúl Menem of the Peronist party to office. In both cases, the military opposed these candidates; Menem's confirmation in office brought a national sigh of relief in Argentina. The success of these transitions contributed to a more abrupt change in neighboring Paraguay, where a military coup deposed long-time dictator Alfredo Stroessner and brought a promise of rapid elections. The widespread condemnation of repression by Chinese troops can only have encouraged South American troops to stay in their barracks.

In Namibia, South Africa finally made decisive steps toward relinquishing its colonial rule of the territory, as the United Nations transitional team officially took control of the country on April 1. But the United Nations, short of funds, hired South African troops as its police force. The big powers – the permanent members of the Security Council – declined to increase the budget for Namibia, and instead they hired the fox to guard the chicken coop. United Nations rule then began not with peace but with a new burst of war, as the South African troops killed scores of troops of SWAPO, the main political party, as they moved from exile in Angola in search of UN posts in Namibia. All parties to the transition plan threatened to pull out, but somehow an agreement was re-established, and plans for UN-supervised national elections resumed.

In two other actions during this period designed to defuse long-term confrontations, the government of Vietnam announced that it would withdraw all of its troops from Cambodia (where they had been since 1978) by September of 1989, and the Palestine Liberation Organization announced a new political program asserting its readiness to recognize the state of Israel. On the other hand, war continued unabated in Afghanistan. The fedayeen opponents of the Najibullah government launched a siege of the city of Jalalabad, near the Pakistani border, as soon as Soviet troops completed their withdrawal, expecting the rapid collapse of the defenders. Instead, the siege met with little success, and the war dragged on.

Then in an evident violation of ethnic rights, the government of Bulgaria reaffirmed its policy of forcing Turkish-speaking Bulgarians to change their names and give up their language, to the point where large numbers of Bulgarian Turks gave up their homes and farms and emigrated to Turkey. The government used the astonishing rationale that the ancestors of these people had been forced by Ottoman Turkish invaders to adopt Islam and Turkish language centuries earlier, so it was not oppressive to require these descendants to adopt Bulgarian ethnicity today.

None of these events was caused by Tiananmen. But in each situation, claims to democratic rights inevitably included references to the demands of demonstrators in China. The terms “democracy” and “democratization” became more prominent in the political lexicon of the time. The widespread condemnations of the repression in China appeared as a global consensus and heightened the impression that international consensus could be achieved on other issues as well.

Breakthrough: Eastern Europe, August 1989–January 1990

When the Chinese state cut back the bloom of democratization, the effect was not to kill the weed but to stimulate new growth: the vine of global consciousness sent out new shoots from every limb. During the last half of 1989, protest movements expanded in one after another country of Eastern Europe, each gaining inspiration and ideas from the movement preceding it. Dense and surprising though this Eastern European flowering was, it was not alone: the vine already had roots on every continent, and produced blooms at the same time in Cambodia, in Benin, in Southern Africa, and in South America.

In Panama, the deeper complexities of the story began to unfold, as the idea of democratization became entangled with great-power politics, drug trade, and nationalism. I shall recount the events of this exciting period – best symbolized by the opening of the Berlin Wall – through alternating, in periods of one or two months, between events in Eastern Europe and events elsewhere in the world.

The summer of 1989 brought the emergence of massive pressures for change in Eastern Europe, for which it became easy to see parallels with the earlier demands of Chinese students. Similarly, comparisons with Chinese events played a part in the affairs of many other countries during that time. In South Africa, for instance, the Mass Democratic Movement – a coalition of many black organizations – carried on a program of civil disobedience to protest the exclusion of blacks from the legal politics of the country. These demonstrations had their effects. State President P. W. Botha resigned from office three weeks before the September 6 whites-only elections, and F. W. de Klerk became State President as well as head of the Nationalist Party. The Nationalists lost seats to the anti-compromise Conservative Party, but De Klerk immediately made plans to visit neighboring African heads of state.

As an even stronger statement of conciliation, on October 16 de Klerk released Walter Sisulu from prison. Sisulu, a leader of both the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party, had been serving a life sentence along with Nelson Mandela and others on charges of treason for his support of armed resistance to the government. His unconditional release and his vocal espousal of the program of the ANC at large meetings opened a new level of dialogue in the country.

Next door in Namibia, events inched toward the planned November elections. Long-time rebel leader Sam Nujoma of SWAPO returned to the country on September 15 and soon spoke to a mass rally. On the other hand, two days before Nujoma's return a leading white member of SWAPO, Anton Lubowski, was assassinated – conceivably through the actions of the South African police still in Namibia.

In another governmental initiative to reduce tensions, the Vietnamese army completed its unilateral withdrawal from Cambodia in mid-September. As in Afghanistan, however, the withdrawal of foreign troops led not to an immediate

dialogue but to continuing stalemate. The governments of China and the U.S. made clear their continued support of guerrilla movements opposing the Cambodian government led by Hunn Senn. In Afghanistan, the battle for Jalalabad had now gone on for six months, and revealed considerable bickering among the guerrilla forces and their Pakistani and American supporters. The Kabul government of Najibullah, in turn, found that its counterattack bogged down rapidly. Its repeated calls for negotiations brought no response.

The politics of international conciliation had advanced a few steps further in Central America, where the five national presidents made an agreement to disband their armies. But one of the five nations, Nicaragua, was unable to extricate itself from confrontation with the United States. The U.S. government continued its support of the anti-government Contras in Nicaragua, pledged to contribute money to anti-government candidates in the coming Nicaraguan elections, and declined to support the regional agreement for disbanding armies.

Elections in the Americas played in a different way on the Chinese events during the summer of 1989, focusing on the hope for orderly institutions for expressing the will of the people. In Haiti, under military rule since the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986, General Prosper Avril announced that elections would be held in late 1990. The newly elected president of Bolivia, Paz Zamora, took office. The Columbian election campaign was marred by the assassination, by the powerful drug interests, of the presidential candidate who had most firmly opposed them. In Chile and Brazil, opposition parties struggled through their long national campaigns.

Changes throughout the world now seemed directly influenced by the magnitude of events in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Hungary proceeded with the reforms initiated early in 1989 and changed its constitution to allow a multi-party political system. In Bulgaria, party leader Todor Zhivkov resigned under pressure both from within the Communist Party and from public criticism. In Namibia the elections for the constituent national assembly took place in November, and gave SWAPO a strong majority that nonetheless fell short of the two-thirds majority which would have given it complete control over the writing of the constitution. National elections in Brazil, on November 15, brought forth as leading candidates the millionaire businessman Fernando Collor e Mello, a conservative, and Workers' Party leader Luiz Ignacio da Silva, known as Lula, a socialist. The Indian parliamentary elections, held November 22-27, brought a great setback to the governing Congress party.

In the West African country of Benin, the socialist government was months behind in paying its salaries. The government offered some modest concessions to postpone a general strike threatened for December 8. Anti-government demonstrators in the streets of Cotonou became more cautious, after December 15, as they saw television reports of the brutality of the fighting in Romania.

In South Africa, President de Klerk met with the imprisoned Nelson Mandela on December 14. On the same day, Patricio Aylwin won election as president of

Chile, successfully invoking the events of Eastern Europe in his support. On December 17, Fernando Collor won the presidency of Brazil: in a close election, he successfully argued that policies proposed by his socialist opponent Lula were now outdated, and that it was time to adopt his free-market approach.

A great-power version of democratization unfolded beginning December 20, with the U.S. invasion of Panama, intended to displace General Manuel Noriega from his position of dominance over that country's government. The invasion took place just after the Soviet-American summit at Malta and after the Brazilian elections. The U.S. accused Noriega of drug trafficking and of falsifying results of the recent Panamanian national elections. At U.S. urging, the Organization of American States had passed resolutions condemning Noriega's actions.

The invasion, announced as a defense of democracy, was very popular in the U.S., and brought forth many supporters in Panama. Its success was compromised, however, by a number of factors. Noriega had earlier worked closely with the U.S., particularly in opposition to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Most Latin American countries quickly denounced the invasion for its violation of the sovereignty of Panama. Noriega himself could not be found for days; he was induced to surrender from his asylum in the Papal Legation on January 3 by intense and noisy American pressure.

In three other notes at the turn of the new year, the United States formally declined to rejoin UNESCO, arguing that it was dominated by Third-World critics of the West; the Emir of Kuwait rejected the demands of demonstrators for the reconvening of a parliament which the Emir had disbanded in 1986; and new ethnic violence broke out in Punjab, on the border of India and Pakistan.

A global movement: South Africa and the world, February-July, 1990

By early 1990 it had become clear that the events of 1989 represented a global movement, not just an accidental collection of heroic national cases. To recognize the movement and to explain it, however, were different matters. At first, people turned to familiar categories in search of an explanation. Thus in the spring of 1990, almost before the ink was dry on the newsprint, the *New York Times* published a collection of dispatches from Eastern Europe and titled it *The Collapse of Communism*. It was indeed a collapse of communism, but this Cold War view of events narrowed the focus, and excluded from discussion the flowering of democracy in Africa and South America.

The events of South Africa in the first half of 1990 made clear that democracy was not the same thing as anti-communism: the South African Communist Party won back its legal status at the very time when other communist parties fell from power. But South African events could not dominate the spring of 1990 to the same degree as had Tiananmen for the spring of 1989 or Eastern Europe for the fall of 1989. South Africa, while home to over 30 million people, was smaller than China or Eastern Europe, and its events were less conclusive. Further, the

South African story had to compete with many others: stories centered in Nicaragua, Germany, Romania, Liberia, and Algeria, among other places. Nonetheless, the story of South Africa had particular meaning for a world in search of democracy.

The confrontation in South Africa went back for generations: the African National Congress, founded in 1913, came into existence in protest to the expropriation of African lands and the elimination of black votes by the then-new government of South Africa. In 1948 the Nationalist Party came to power on a program of "apartheid," defining and segregating racial groups in every area of life. But the worldwide decline of colonialism and racial segregation combined with the militant protests of young South Africans to put pressure on South African whites to find a way out of their confrontation. White conservatives stumbled into the leader they needed in F. W. de Klerk, an old-time nationalist politician who showed himself capable of great flexibility.

Nelson Mandela, on the other side, was a remarkable combination of a powerful symbol, a visionary, and a sharp political tactician. At age seventy, he had served over twenty-five years in prison for seeking military means to oppose apartheid. His infrequent and indirect contacts with supporters, while in prison, suggested that he maintained the personal power of his earlier years.

On February 3, 1990, President de Klerk announced that Mandela would be released unconditionally from prison. On February 11, Mandela emerged from the Pollsmoor prison and walked to join the waiting crowd, his fist held high in triumph. (The importance of these days is agreed by all, though I have noted that whites in South Africa tend to see February 3 as the turning point, while blacks tend to see February 11 as the key date.) Mandela spoke in Cape Town, and his remarks were broadcast around the world: he called for national reconciliation, but also for rapid political change. After several more speeches in South Africa, Mandela left immediately for Zambia, where the exiled headquarters of the ANC were located in Lusaka, and then he traveled to other African countries to offer thanks for years of support.

In freeing Mandela, de Klerk's government also legalized the banned political parties — the ANC, the PAC, and the Communist Party of South Africa. The country's conflicts were by no means resolved, but they would now be debated openly at every level. The openness of Berlin had now come to Cape Town and Johannesburg.

The impact of South African events, in turn, showed up in unexpected places. The day after Mandela's release, demonstrators gathered in Katmandu, Nepal, to celebrate his freedom. Then, identifying his cause with their own, they raised demands that their king should convene a parliament. The demonstrations grew, reinforced by the news from abroad suggesting that old political obstacles might now give way. Within a month the demonstrators had in fact gained substantial concessions from the government, and Nepal lurched suddenly from autocracy to multi-party government.

Meanwhile, the momentum of transformation continued in those countries where sharp political changes began in 1989. Vaclav Havel, president of Czechoslovakia, visited the U.S. Hungary confirmed its old Catholic tradition by opening relations with the Vatican. In Namibia, the constitutional convention that had been elected in November moved rapidly to complete the delicate work of balancing factional interests, and in February it elected Sam Nujoma of SWAPO as president of the nation.

Benin, which had backed away from the abyss of civil strife in December, convened a remarkable national conference in the last ten days of February. Stormy and articulate debate, among the 500 delegates representing most of the country's interest groups, was followed closely by the nation on radio and television. The conference asserted its sovereignty over the country, and induced President Mathieu Kérékou to accept its leadership. It then selected a prime minister (World Bank economist Nicéphore Soglo), gave him powers to replace Kérékou as the dominant influence in government, and set up mechanisms both for writing a new constitution and for supervising the government.

In this same week, the February 26 national elections in Nicaragua brought defeat for the Sandinista government, and brought to power newspaper owner Violetta Chamorro. In one sense it was a great-power victory for the U.S., which had pressed Daniel Ortega's government in every possible way, and finally achieved its ouster. In another sense, it was a step forward for democratic process: voting was free and open, and most voters chose the option of replacing the incumbents with an opposition in the hope that it would bring better social and economic conditions. The transition to the new government passed remarkably smoothly.

In South Africa, the excitement of announcing the path to consensus began to give way to addressing the many practical obstacles along that path. If Mandela and de Klerk had hoped for a rapid agreement on a new government, they were to be disappointed. In February the Pan-Africanist Congress announced that it would refuse to take part in the ANC-government discussions on the nation's future, arguing that the government had made insufficient concessions. Meanwhile factional fighting broke out in the black townships of South Africa's major cities. These were party and ethnic disputes among blacks who now would have some hope of political power. They were struggles between supporters of the ANC and supporters of Inkatha, a party seeking to be a middle force between ANC and the government; they were battles among groups of Zulu-speakers, and between Zulu-speakers and Xhosa-speakers. In addition, as later evidence revealed, the disputes were fueled murderously by police, army and other elements of the state that disagreed with the new policy of conciliation.

Still, the political opening continued. In April Joe Slovo, secretary of the South African Communist Party and a leader of ANC as well, returned from years of exile and gave addresses to large audiences. And on May 2, the formal dialogue between the ANC and the government began with a week-long set of meetings.

During May and June, the government of South Africa repealed a number of basic apartheid laws.

At the beginning of June, Nelson Mandela left South Africa for a three-week trip through Europe and North America. He was met everywhere with huge audiences – in person, and in television broadcasts of his speeches. Mandela spoke in a broad and topical language of democracy that struck his listeners with its immediacy. It alternated between vagueness and specificity as effectively as the slogans of the students at Tiananmen, and drew a sense of commitment out of people based on their identity as blacks, as workers, as Africans, as the economically deprived, as supporters of the Western democratic tradition, and as supporters of human rights.

A flood tide of democratic developments appeared to be rising during the spring of 1990. On March 21, Namibia gained its formal independence from South Africa. National elections took place in a wide range of countries. In Hungary, the Socialist Party (formerly Communist) lost power as two other coalitions, one urban and one rural, won most of the parliamentary seats in the March 25 voting. On May 20, elections confirmed the leadership of the National Salvation Committee in Romania. In Peru, the unheralded Alberto Fujimori led the first round of the presidential elections. In May, parliamentary elections in Myanmar (Burma) were won by parties in opposition to the governing military clique; the problem was that the new parliament was not convened. In June, elections were held in various Soviet republics: Boris Yeltsin was elected president of the Russian republic by the new parliament.

In the same period Lithuania declared its independence from the Soviet Union, Helmut Kohl began a campaign for the unification of Germany, and President Chamorro of Nicaragua negotiated with both her United States supporters and her Sandinista opponents to establish a secure new government. In Chile, President Aylwin provided public compensation to the family of Orlando Letelier, who had been assassinated in 1975 in Washington D.C. at the direction of Chile's military rulers.

Elsewhere, the progress of democratization was slower. Some of the difficulties of democratization showed up in Brazil, where President Collor tried to implement a tough anti-inflation policy, and in Argentina, where public employees responded to a similar policy with large-scale work stoppages. In Kuwait, the emir conceded that a parliament might be selected, though he said it would have advisory powers only. On March 25, India withdrew its troops from Sri Lanka, but this would not bring an end to inter-ethnic violence there; in India itself, political bombings took place in April. In Côte d'Ivoire, demonstrators critical of the government gained a promise of a multi-party system, but the governing party retained a near-monopoly on power. Zairian president Mobutu announced that the country would have a multi-party democracy; the press became freer, but little else changed. In Haiti, General Prosper Avril declared a state of siege in March as opposition to him grew, but gave up and resigned in April as the opposition continued to mount.

Further, there were instances of major conflicts developing in the course of democratization movements. In April, elections in two of the republics making up Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia, revealed ethnic disputes that would eventually tear the country apart. In Czechoslovakia as well, differences between Czechs and Slovaks began to threaten the nation's stability. And in Afghanistan, critics of President Najibullah within the regime attempted a coup on March 6.

In June and July, a similar balance was evident in world events: many important steps toward democratization, but a strong countercurrent of conflict and repression. The most dramatic new development came in the July municipal elections in Algeria, held in response to the demonstrations of late 1988. In these elections the Islamic Solidarity Front (FIS) won the largest single number of seats. Opponents of this religious-political coalition, both inside and outside Algeria, argued that it was impossible for a Muslim theocratic organization to be democratic. Others, however, argued that the expression of the will of the people, as they cast their ballots, was sufficient to label this as a move toward democracy.

Elsewhere, Czechoslovakia held parliamentary elections on June 8–9, and Mongolia held multi-party elections, won by the governing Communist Party. The socialist government of the tiny Atlantic island country of Cape Verde prepared for multi-party elections. The United Nations prepared to send observers to oversee the upcoming election in Haiti. In Chile the Truth and Reconciliation Commission began its work, and issues of human rights were debated in Brazil and Argentina, especially in reference to military and police activities. The Soviet Communist Party held a congress to plan its response to the events of the day, and the Vietnamese Communist Party underwent a series of reforms.

Other events of June and July reflected increases rather than decreases in tension. In Gabon a national conference was organized hurriedly to short-circuit public protest. In Liberia an armed rebellion broke out against President Samuel Doe, who had come to power by a military coup. In Somalia rebellion broke out against President Siad Barre. In both countries, ample weapons supplied had built up through close military alliance with the U.S., and the wars took heavy casualties. In Ethiopia the long-term civil wars heated up as rebel groups gained strength; in Afghanistan the battle for Jalalabad continued after more than a year of fighting on the city's outskirts. Elsewhere, street battles broke out in Romania between supporters of the governing NSC and opponents drawn from urban professionals and from some rural people; and refugees began leaving Albania for Italy in a pattern reminiscent of the departures from East Germany. On the diplomatic front the United States, which had agreed to open a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization in mid-1989, now broke off those discussions.

The world is large and complex enough that no single pattern of events could dominate it. Still, by the middle of 1990 a remarkable sequence of democratization movements had brought a clear sense of momentum in political change, and in popular involvement in major political decisions. The move toward reform and reconciliation in South Africa provided the strongest example of that sense of

momentum. Because of the breadth of interest in South Africa's changes, as reinforced by broad media coverage and by Nelson Mandela's travels, people on every continent gained a sense of participation in global change through that case alone. In addition, the South African case was reinforced by national conferences in Benin and elsewhere in Africa, by elections of reform governments in South America, by the continuing transformation of Eastern Europe, by the local elections in Algeria, and by popular demonstrations in such other countries as Nepal and Myanmar.

Detour: Persian Gulf confrontation, August 1990–February 1991

The cold realities of confrontation and war in the Persian Gulf disrupt my tale of democracy in flower. The massing of armies, the looting of Kuwait, the high-tech battlefield experiments, the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure, Iraqi retaliations against Kurdish dissidents – these events seem far removed from free speech, free elections and free market. But these events were prominent in the story of their time, and to leave them out would be to step back from telling a fully global tale.

The Persian Gulf confrontation was not another flowering of democracy. But it can be seen as an encounter of the global democratization movement, then at its peak, with a range of other forces. Democratization does not explain why Saddam Hussein chose to invade Kuwait on August 2 – though Hussein was able to argue that he was fulfilling Iraqi national destiny, and was able to point out that the emir of Kuwait had recently snuffed out a movement calling for creation of a parliament and multi-party government. Democratization does not explain why George Bush put such effort into organizing a powerful global consensus against Iraq – though Bush was able to argue that Iraq had violated the national sovereignty of Kuwait, and was able to obtain almost unanimous support for his response at all levels of the United Nations.

The democratization movement was now caught in a maelstrom of political and economic forces, centered on the Persian Gulf. The movement survived the conflict, but emerged transformed. Still, during the buildup to war and in its aftermath, the vines of democracy continued to bloom in other locales. The story of this period must therefore alternate between events of the Persian Gulf and those other locales: Germany at the time of its unification, Haiti at the time of its national election, Angola during the settlement of its long civil war, and the Soviet Union as its divisions grew more severe.

Elsewhere in the world during August and September, pages continued to turn in the various chapters of the grand saga of democratization. In South Africa, the ANC announced that it would suspend armed struggle in order to participate in dialogue with the government. In Nepal the new constitution was adopted, and preparations for parliamentary elections began. In Cambodia, efforts to end the long confrontation began to bear fruit: a series of meetings convened by

Indonesia resulted in the formal creation of a Supreme National Council, in which all parties to the conflict would have membership. Alberto Fujimori took office as president in Peru. In elections, the Communist Party won parliamentary elections in Mongolia, and the New Democratic Party won elections in the Canadian province of Ontario. In the former case, the incumbents moved fast enough in their reforms to avoid losing public support. In the latter case a socialist party won election at a time when many socialist parties were falling from power, but the New Democrats campaigned effectively on the electorate's desire to see a periodic alternation in power.

Germany unified in October of 1990, with East Germany being legally absorbed into the West. Other sequels to earlier advances in democratization were the election of Solidarity leader Lech Walesa as president of Poland (where Jaruzelski agreed to resign early in his term in order to permit the new election); the beginnings of a consensus among the warring parties in Angola, brokered by Portugal; election of the nationalist leader Ziad Gamsakhurdia as president of the Soviet republic of Georgia; and negotiations in Afghanistan between President Najibullah and certain rebel groups.

Also under cover of the American preoccupation with the Persian Gulf, a long-simmering democratization movement advanced to a new and explosive stage. Presidential elections for Haiti were scheduled for December 1990, and the leading candidate was Jean Bazin, a World Bank economist known as a reformer, and acceptable to the United States. At the last minute in November, however, a new candidate entered the race: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the Catholic priest imbued with liberation theology and known for his passionate espousal of the cause of Haiti's poor, both in city and countryside, and for his militant critique of the remaining elements of the Duvalier regime. In the December election, Aristide won with about 70 percent of the vote. U.S. policy makers were unhappy with the result, yet entered into discussions with Aristide as he prepared to take office.

Meanwhile the Asian Games unfolded without incident in Beijing, thus fulfilling the ambitions of the Chinese government to rebuild its national prestige and distance itself from the memory of the 1989 demonstrations. In Argentina a section of the army rebelled; in Panama the police rebelled; in Zaire the army attacked a political demonstration.

In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev shifted his political tactics once again in late 1990, and moved to align himself with Soviet leaders who were cautious about the pace and the direction of reform. The main step in this tactical reorientation was his support for the candidacy of Gennady Yanayev as vice-president of the Soviet Union, a proposal that Gorbachev had to bring to the Supreme Soviet twice in order to gain approval. It was under these circumstances that Gorbachev's long-time friend and ally, foreign minister Shevardnadze, abruptly resigned from office, warning vaguely of the possibility of a dictatorship, and leaving office before war broke out.

Toward an analysis

War in Kuwait and Iraq began, as scheduled, just after January 15. Last-minute alternatives came to no avail: Soviet president Gorbachev proposed a compromise plan to which Saddam Hussein gave tentative approval, but U.S. president Bush saw it as unsatisfactory. The high-technology weapons of the U.S. and its allies proved devastating. Iraq launched Scud missiles against Saudi Arabia and Israel, though without great effect. After ten days of relentless bombing, the ground advance began with virtually no resistance. Then at the end of January, Bush ordered his troops pulled back rather than continue ahead to occupy Baghdad and remove Hussein from power.

I discontinue my narrative at this point, although the drama went on for another two years. I argue that the full range of forces and dynamics of interplay among social movements had been placed in evidence by the end of 1990, though the actual outcomes were yet to be determined in many situations. So far I have focused on a narrative that sets forth implicitly the dynamics of rising and declining social movements, the formation of alliances among camps, and the development of techniques for encouraging or discouraging further social contestation.

For one set of events – that of the national conferences in francophone Africa from 1990 to 1993 – I wrote up an initial analysis for seventeen countries (Manning 1999). It distinguished two polar influences and two contesting scripts for resolving social contestation. On one hand, “civil society” sought to convene “national conferences” to rewrite the constitution; on the other hand, “the power” rejected national conferences with tactics ranging from snap elections to crude repression. These events, now 20 years past, remain a fascinating laboratory for the study of interacting social movements.

Here at least and at last are some factors that need to be considered in the analysis. In addition to the underlying potential for social unrest, social movements need slogans and devices with which to gain momentum. The unfolding of parallel events in various parts of the world is central to the emergence of broad alliances; in this process it is important that commoners have flexible identities, enabling them to identify firmly with their local movement and at the same time identify on a slightly different principle with distant movements. Experienced leaders and experienced rank-and-file are important to the advance of most movements. To resist social movements, local elites must use repression to demonstrate their power but must also rely on distraction and compromise. At the same time, local elites must seek alliance with great and distant powers. Though the great powers are already engaged, they must make eclectic and shifting alliances to form a coalition that weakens social movements. In addition, any analysis must account for unexpected events that may shift the balance, such as Saddam Hussein’s seizure of Kuwait or Aristide’s electoral victory in Haiti.

The global interaction of social movements will return, at some time and for some reason. Social science has the opportunity to study their interactions and the

responses of established powers, past and present, as a part of the current project of learning how to incorporate global dimensions into social analyses that remain disproportionately focused on national levels or simple comparisons of national cases.

Notes

- 1 Social movements, while arising out of local situations, are not assumed to be strictly local: in every case they are local configurations of local conditions in interaction with a host of larger-scale factors.
- 2 The story of the longer-term rise of pressures for outbursts against governing elites – including their restriction of broader political representation and their monopolization of economic resources – is a complex tale to assemble, and I address it only very briefly here. One of the greatest ironies of the democratization movements is that the critique of central planning and elite privilege in economic affairs, as it gained strength, ended up giving unexpected support to the free-market ideology of right-wing business communities. As a result, the social movements of 1989 brought a massive change in global political consensus but opened the door for an astonishing concentration of wealth through private-sector accumulation and financialization.
- 3 I advance little discussion of ideology in this narrative of the interaction of social movements. Comparing this study with others in this volume made me see that as a shortcoming. Therefore, in my adjoining commentary on chapters in this section of the book, I develop some reflections on ideological dimensions of interconnecting social movements.
- 4 Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1969), 97–189; Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1968). One more point before entering the narrative. The narrative of 1989 and 1990 ends up relying, here as elsewhere, on instantaneous communication through electronic media. I am sure, however, that while these media affect the pace of interaction, they are not the fundamental cause of global connection. I earlier wrote a comparison of interacting social movements in 1789–1792 with 1989–1992, to argue that the dynamics were remarkably parallel (Manning 2005).

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